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Abstract
In this paper we use administrative data from the social security to study income 
dynamics and income risk inequality in Spain between 2005 and 2018. We construct 
individual measures of income risk as functions of past employment history, income, and 
demographics. Focusing on males, we document that income risk is highly unequal in 
Spain: more than half of the economy has close to perfect predictability of their income, 
while some face considerable uncertainty. Income risk is inversely related to income and 
age, and income risk inequality increases markedly in the recession. These findings are 
robust to a variety of specifications, including using neural networks for prediction and 
allowing for individual unobserved heterogeneity.
Keywords: Spain, income dynamics, administrative data, income risk, inequality.
JEL classification: D31, E24, E31, J31.
Resumen
En este estudio utilizamos datos administrativos de la Seguridad Social para analizar la 
dinámica de los ingresos laborales y la incertidumbre respecto a ingresos futuros en España 
entre 2005 y 2018. Construimos medidas individuales de dicha incertidumbre basadas en 
características demográficas y en el historial laboral de trabajos y de ingresos pasados. 
Para el caso de los hombres, documentamos que la incertidumbre de ingresos es muy 
desigual en España: más de la mitad de los individuos tienen una previsibilidad casi 
perfecta sobre sus ingresos futuros en el horizonte de un año, frente al resto, que se 
enfrenta a una incertidumbre considerable. La incertidumbre es mayor para las rentas 
más bajas y para los más jóvenes, y aumenta sustancialmente durante las recesiones. 
Estos resultados son robustos utilizando especificaciones alternativas, incluyendo 
modelos de predicción basados en redes neuronales y considerando heterogeneidad 
individual no observada.
Palabras clave: España, dinámica de los ingresos, datos administrativos, incertidumbre 
de ingresos, desigualdad.
Códigos JEL: D31, E24, E31, J31.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality is the focus of a large empirical literature, which now spans many countries
over decades or centuries (Atkinson, 2003, Alvaredo et al., 2017). However, the measurement
of cross-sectional inequality only provides an incomplete understanding of the diversity of
individual income trajectories, since it cannot account for upward and downward mobility or
the effect of economic shocks on individual careers.
The increased availability of longitudinal records on income and employment has moti-
vated a related literature that concentrates on income dynamics. While a number of con-
tributions are based on survey data (e.g., Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994, Geweke and Keane,
2000, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004, Browning et al., 2010, Arellano et al., 2017), there has
been a recent surge in the use of administrative income records. Administrative data offers
several advantages relative to surveys, such as large representative samples, complete em-
ployment spells over long horizons, and high-quality information. The use of administrative
data has led to new findings about the dynamics of income, in the US and other countries
(e.g., Guvenen et al., 2014, Guvenen et al., forthcoming, Busch et al., forthcoming).
A central motivation of the income dynamics literature is to quantify income risk. In
many models and in real life, the ability to forecast one’s future income is a key determinant
of economic decisions. However, the way researchers measure income risk is usually indirect,
based on statistical models of the dynamics of income. The nonparametric approach to
income dynamics, which has been put forward in Guvenen et al. (forthcoming) and related
work, produces statistics such as conditional moments of log income changes that are related
to income risk, yet this approach does not target risk directly. In this paper, we develop a
methodology for constructing measures of individual income risk.
We are interested in documenting income risk and uncertainty. Unpredictability of income
can have a major impact on consumption and saving decisions (Deaton, 1992). We focus on
annual income, although we note that within-year variations may also be relevant sources
of income risk (Morduch and Schneider, 2019). Risk, as we define it, differs from income
volatility and instability, which have been the focus of a number of studies (Haider, 2001,
Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2009, Ziliak et al., 2011), and are at the center of a recent debate
1
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in the US (Bloom et al., 2017). Income volatility is typically measured as the dispersion of
the changes of log earnings, or of their transitory component. While we will also report such
measures, they differ from income risk, which is the part of income changes that cannot be
predicted by the agent. To construct individual measures of risk, we will try to capture key
determinants of the agent’s information set using administrative records.
Our empirical focus is the Spanish economy. The recent Spanish experience is charac-
terized by a high level and large fluctuations of unemployment. In Figure 1 we report the
unemployment rate (in triangles), together with real GDP growth (in circles), from 2005 to
2018. Using administrative social security records to study cross-sectional income inequality,
Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) found that the double-dipped recession that started in 2008
saw a large increase in inequality (see also Anghel et al., 2018). However, the literature is
silent on the nature and evolution of income dynamics in Spain. More broadly, we still lack
a description and understanding of the large cross-sectional inequality in individual income
risk, at given age and over the life cycle.
Against this background, our first goal is to document a novel set of facts about income
dynamics in Spain. To this end, we exploit administrative tax records that were matched to
the social security data, and are available since 2005. We are interested in documenting how
income inequality and dynamics evolved in recent years. An important goal of this analysis
2
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is to study the level and evolution of moments of the distribution of log income changes,
such as dispersion and skewness. In doing so, we follow the model set by the Global Income
Dynamics project, and applied to a number of other countries in this volume.
Our second and main goal is to quantify income risk, and to study the inequality of
individual income security, taking the Spanish economy as a case study. Our premise is that
some people can predict with almost certainty their income one year ahead, while others
face considerable uncertainty. In Spain, inequality in income risk is related to the prevalence
of high unemployment, but also to the large share of short-term temporary employment
that produces high job turnover (Felgueroso et al., 2017). We develop a methodology for
constructing measures of income risk as a function of social security employment records, past
income, contract type, and demographics. Having obtained an index of individual income
risk, we then study its cross-sectional distribution, its persistence, and how it changes with
age and the aggregate conditions of the Spanish economy.
In the first part of the paper we focus on income inequality and dynamics. We find that
inequality increases strongly in the recession, particularly for males. The increase in inequality
characterizes the entire recession period, confirming previous findings in the literature. In
addition, the recession is also characterized by an increase in the dispersion of year-to-year
log earnings changes, and by a decrease in skewness. While there has been some debate about
whether dispersion is countercyclical in the US (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2004, Guvenen et al.,
2014), the procyclical skewness of changes in log annual earnings has been documented in
several countries (see Busch et al., forthcoming, Hoffmann and Malacrino, 2019, Pora and
Wilner, 2020).
In the second part of the paper we study income risk, its determinants, and its evolution.
We measure income risk using prediction methods, based on a set of predictors at the individ-
ual and aggregate levels. Our main risk measure is a coefficient of variation (CV), computed
as the ratio of the mean absolute deviation of income divided by the mean of income, both
of them conditional on a set of predictors. For example, a worker with an expected income
of 20,000 euros and a CV of 10 percent expects a deviation of her next year’s income from its
mean of ±2000 euros. The CV is a feature of the predictive distribution of income. Under
the assumption that our set of predictors exhausts the agent’s information set, this predictive
3
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distribution summarizes the income uncertainty that she faces. Using a calculation in the
spirit of Lucas’ measurement of the welfare cost of business cycles (Lucas, 1987), we show
how, under certain assumptions, the squared CV can be related to how much consumption
the agent would have to forgo in order to eliminate income risk. However, the macroeconomic
consequences of individual variation in income risk of the magnitude attested by our results
are yet to be explored.
The econometrics of measuring income risk is a prediction problem. In our baseline
approach, we use as predictors aspects of income and employment history, contract type, and
demographics, augmented with a set of indicators of the macroeconomic conditions at the
national and provincial level. Our predictive models are based on exponential specifications,
and we use Poisson regressions for estimation. Using a large set of predictors is important to
compute a reliable risk measure. Indeed, using the final year of our data as a hold-out sample,
we show that, relative to a specification solely based on lagged income, including additional
predictors improves the prediction of income absolute deviations, the use of employment
history being particularly informative.
We find that risk is highly unequal in Spain: more than half of the economy has close
to perfect predictability of their income, while some face considerable uncertainty. We also
document that the inequality of income risk, as measured by our CV, increases markedly in
the recession. Notably, this behavior is only driven by the upper part of the risk distribution.
More than half of the Spanish economy faces low levels of risk, which do not vary over the
period. Risk affects disproportionately the young, and the individuals in the bottom part of
the income distribution. In addition, risk is highly persistent over time: an individual in the
bottom half of the risk distribution today is poised to face virtually no risk next year. Overall,
these findings suggest that more than half of the Spanish economy is effectively shielded from
income risk, whereas the other part of the economy is subject to high levels of risk.
Our risk measure depends on the quality of the predictors and prediction models that we
use. We probe the robustness of our baseline approach in various ways. First, we replace
the exponential regression models by neural network specifications. Neural networks are
universal approximators, and they are increasingly used for flexible modeling (Hornik et al.,
1989, Goodfellow et al., 2016, Farrell et al., 2021). Second, we estimate specifications that
4
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allow for unobserved heterogeneity, in addition to observed predictors, following a discrete
approach as in Bonhomme et al. (2021). Third, as complements to the CV, we compute
quantile-based measures of risk. All these exercises confirm the basic findings obtained using
our baseline method. In addition, while the analysis in most of the paper is based on pre-tax
income, we show that accounting for the Spanish tax system in the income measure has little
impact on our substantive findings. Lastly, we find that, in contrast with the rest of the
economy, the CV of Spanish civil servants, who enjoy high levels of job and income security,
are all concentrated around low values and do not vary over the period.
In the last part of the paper, we complement our CV measure of income risk, which is
based on longitudinal administrative records and a prediction approach, by studying subjec-
tive income expectations as reported in survey data. Responses to probabilistic subjective
expectations questions can be used to directly quantify the income risk faced by individuals,
and thus provide a valuable complement to observational measures of risk (Dominitz and
Manski, 1997, Kaufmann and Pistaferri, 2009, Arellano, 2014). By showing a broad agree-
ment between our prediction-based measure and the subjective expectation-based measure, in
spite of the many differences in their construction, our confidence in both measures increases.
We rely on subjective income expectations questions from the Spanish Survey of Household
Finances. Assuming a household-specific log normal random walk predictive income process,
we estimate subjective standard deviations of income growth for every household in 2014.
We find that, according to this measure, many households face relatively low levels of risk
and there is substantial risk dispersion between households. In addition, similarly to our CV
measure, subjective standard deviations tend to be higher for the young, and for households
with low income.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the administrative dataset we
use for the analysis. In Section 3 we report a set of facts on income dynamics in Spain. In
Section 4 we describe how we measure individual income risk. In Section 5 we document the
magnitude and evolution of income risk and income risk inequality in Spain. In Section 6 we
compare our risk measure with subjective expectations data. Finally, we conclude in Section
7. An appendix contains additional results.
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2 Data
Our main data source comes from the Continuous Work History Sample (Muestra Continua
de Vidas Laborales, MCVL, in Spanish), which is a 4% non-stratified random sample from
the Spanish population registered with the social security administration in the reference
year. Since 2005, individuals who are present in a wave and subsequently remain registered
with the social security administration stay as sample members. In addition, the sample is
refreshed with new sample members so it remains representative of the population in each
wave. To complement our main data source, we match social security employment histories
with income tax and census records.
For each employment spell, we observe the start date and end date of the labor contract,
the part-time or full-time status of the employee, the type of contract (temporary or perma-
nent), and the sector of employment (public or private). We also observe some information
about the establishment, including the province where it is registered and the industry. In
addition, by linking the longitudinal data with census records, we have access to individual
demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and highest educational attainment.
The MCVL records monthly social security contributions, going back to 1980, however
these contributions are top and bottom coded. Since 2005, the MCVL is matched to data
from the tax authority, which provides us with uncensored individual income from paid
employment accumulated in a calendar year, as reported by employers to the tax authority,
as well as unemployment benefits and subsidies.1
We focus our analysis on annual income. In the first part of the paper in Section 3,
we focus on annual labor earnings from paid employment. In the second part starting in
Section 4, we use a broader measure of earnings that also includes unemployment benefits
and subsidies. All earnings measures are deflated to 2018 euros using the Spanish consumer
price index.
The data we rely on have two main limitations. First, the period of observation is rel-
atively short. As mentioned above, for the years prior to 2005, income records are top and
1The tax information comes from “model 190”, the “Annual summary of retentions and payments for the
personal income tax on earnings, economic activities, awards and income imputations.” This form is required
of all entities that pay wages, pensions or unemployment benefits. It covers all beneficiaries, including those
whose wages fall below the legal minimum of exemption for the obligation to declare personal income taxes.
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bottom coded, so we focus n the period 2005-2018 where we observe u censor d annual
earnings from ax information. Seco d, the MCVL does n t permit to link individuals to
households. Hence, our study will necessarily be silent on within-household risk sharing and
insurance.
Sample selection. We focus our analysis on workers who are between 25 and 55 years
old, are not self-employed, and do not live in the Basque Country or Navarra (for which
the tax data does not provide coverage). In the first part of the paper, following the GID
project’s conventions, we trim annual earnings below a threshold y
t
, which corresponds to
working part-time for one quarter at the national minimum wage. This trimming is meant
to avoid workers with weak attachment to the labor force. In Appendix Table F1 we report
the percentage of observations below the income threshold. It is important to note that
the proportion of observations below the threshold is quite large, and that it varies over the
period. For this reason, to study income risk we will rely on a broader sample that includes
individuals with low or zero annual earnings.
In our analysis of income dynamics in the first part of the paper, we refer to three
samples. In the “CS” (cross-sectional) sample, we only impose the restrictions on age and
minimum earnings. For the analyses that involve dynamics, we impose additional restrictions
on the data and focus on two subsamples. The “LS” (longitudinal) sample only includes
observations with non-missing one-year and five-year individual earnings changes. In turn,
the “H” (heterogeneity) sample is further restricted to non-missing average earnings over the
past three years.
In our analysis of individual income risk in the second part of the paper, we will primarily
refer to the “B” (broader) sample, which extends our measure of earnings in two dimensions.
First, we use a broader measure of income, which includes both earnings from paid work
as well as unemployment benefits. Combining both sources of income allows us to speak
towards risk in an earnings measure more relevant to individual consumption and investment
decisions. While this income measure does not include other sources of taxes or transfers,
which we do not observe in the MCVL, we will also report results based on after-tax income
using a simple rule to impute tax amounts to the individuals in our data. Second, we do not
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impose a threshold to trim the earnings; that is, we include earnings observations that fall
below the threshold, including zeros.2 A non-negligible share of the Spanish economy has
annual earnings below y
t
. This is a salient margin of risk that we want to capture. At the
same time, since labor force attachment is lower for females, and we do not have information
on the household (e.g., spousal income), inferring income risk for females would raise major
challenges. For this reason, we do not include females in the B sample, and we will focus our
analysis of income risk on males only.
Descriptive statistics. We provide descriptive statistics about the samples in the ap-
pendix.3 The number of observations and the composition of the sample vary over the
period. Indeed, the recession years between 2008 and 2013 are associated with smaller sam-
ple sizes, which reflect lower participation to the labor market, and a somewhat older and
more educated labor force. The share of females increases slightly, albeit steadily, during the
period. Mean income tends to increase in the recession, particularly in the case of males.
Moreover, while the percentiles at the bottom of the earnings distribution follow a U-shaped
evolution, the earnings percentiles above the median vary little over the period.
3 Income inequality and income dynamics in Spain
In this section we report a set of statistics on the dynamics of income in the Spanish social
security data. Here the core quantities are characteristics of the distributions of individual
log earnings changes, as in Guvenen et al. (forthcoming) and work inspired by their empirical
methodology.
2In the MCVL, we only know for sure that an individual is unemployed when she receives unemployment
benefits. Years when an individual is not receiving paid work, self-employment income, unemployment benefits,
or pension benefits, correspond to zero income. This may overstate the relevant zeros, since the individual
may have exited the labor market, found work out of the country where the Social Security agency has
no jurisdiction, have returned to further education, or have transitioned to self-employment without official
registration. To alleviate this issue, we impose a maximum of two zeros after the end of any observed labor
market spell (be it a contract for paid work or a spell of receiving unemployment benefits), and we drop
all observations after the imposed maximum of two zeros. We also estimated our baseline specification on
samples where we included those observations and treated them as zero income. We found qualitatively similar
patterns, with a stronger income risk inequality increase in the recession.
3In Appendix Tables F2 and F3 we how summary statistics for the CS sample, and in Appendix Tables
F5, F7, and F9 for the LS and H samples (both of them restricted to non-missing 1-year and 5-year changes
in log earnings), and for the B sample, respectively. In Appendix Tables F4, F6, F8, and F10 we show the
same summary statistics where we convert earnings to US Dollars using the 2018 exchange rate.
8
impose a threshold to trim the earnings; that is, we include earnings observations that fall
below the threshold, including zeros.2 A non-negligible share of the Spanish economy has
annual earnings below y
t
. This is a salient margin of risk that we want to capture. At the
same t me, since labor force attachment is lower for females, and we do not hav information
on the household (e.g., spousal income), i ferring income risk f r females would raise major
challenges. For this ason, we do not include fem les in the B sample, and we will focu our
analysis of in om risk on males only.
Descriptive statistics. We provide descriptive statistics about the samples in the ap-
pendix.3 The number of observations and the composition of the sample vary over the
period. Indeed, the recession years between 2008 and 2013 are associated with smaller sam-
ple sizes, which reflect lower participation to the labor market, and a somewhat older and
more educated labor force. The share of females increases slightly, albeit steadily, during the
period. Mean income tends to increase in the recession, particularly in the case of males.
Moreover, while the percentiles at the bottom of the earnings distribution follow a U-shaped
evolution, the earnings percentiles above the median vary little over the period.
3 Income inequality and income dynamics in Spain
In this section we report a set of statistics on the dynamics of income in the Spanish social
security data. Here the core quantities are characteristics of the distributions of individual
log earnings changes, as in Guvenen et al. (forthcoming) and work inspired by their empirical
methodology.
2In the MCVL, we only know for sure that an individual is unemployed when she receives unemployment
benefits. Years when an individual is not receiving p id work, self-employment income, unemployment benefits,
or pensio benefits, correspond to zero income. This ay overstate the releva t zeros, si ce the individual
may have exited the labor market, found work out of the country where the Social Security agency has
no jurisdiction, h ve returned to further education, or have tr n itio ed to self-employm nt without official
registration. To alleviate this issue, we impose a maximum of two zeros after the end of any observed labor
market spell (be it a contract for paid work or a spell of receiving unemployment benefits), and we drop
all observations after the imposed maximum of two zeros. We also estimated our baseline specification on
samples where we included those observations and treated them as zero income. We found qualitatively similar
patterns, with a stronger income risk inequality increase in the recession.
3In Appendix Tables F2 and F3 we how summary statistics for the CS sample, and in Appendix Tables
F5, F7, and F9 for the LS and H samples (both of them restricted to non-missing 1-year and 5-year changes
in log earnings), and for the B sample, respectively. In Appendix Tables F4, F6, F8, and F10 we show the
same summary statistics where we convert earnings to US Dollars using the 2018 exchange rate.
8
3.1 Income inequality
In Figure 2 we start by showing percentiles of log eal earnings, by gender, from 2005 to
2018, taking 2005 as the refer ce year.4 In the top two graphs, we show the 10th, 25th,
dian, 75th, and 90th percentiles for males and females, respectively. While the evolution of
e rni gs percentil s over the period shows that earnings inequality i creases in the recessio ,
it also highlights a contrast between males and females. For males, e ni gs pe centil
above the median vary lit le during the peri d, however the 10th and 25th percentiles drop
sharply during the great recession, and nly start to recover after 2013. As a result, earnings
inequality increases in the recession. This confirms the findings documented in Bonho me
and Hospido (2017). For females, we observe a similar pattern, albeit quantitatively much
less pronounced, in line with the findings of Bonhomme and Hospido (2013) on the first part
of the period.
In the bottom two graphs of Figure 2 we show various percentiles at the top of the distri-
bution of log annual earnings, up to the 99.5th percentile. For both genders, top percentiles
tend to decrease between 2009 and 2013. However, this decrease is quantitatively small. In
addition, the graphs show that all percentiles above the 90th tend to evolve similarly over
the period. This suggests that, in Spain, the recession did not affect top labor incomes (i.e.,
99th percentile and above) differently from the rest of the top decile. Note that, due to
relatively small sample sizes, we are not able to reliably document the evolution of earnings
percentiles above the 99.5th in the MCVL. Note also that, given our data, we only include
labor earnings, and do not account for capital income in the analysis.
The stability over time of the upper part of the Spanish income distribution, including
the right tail, stands in contrast with the experience of other countries, such as the US and
the UK (Piketty and Saez, 2013).5 For Spain, this evidence is consistent with results from
survey data in recent years (Anghel et al., 2018). Using top coded administrative records and
extrapolation, Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) found that the P90-P50 percentile difference
increased substantially between 1988 and 1996, explaining most of the increase in inequality
4In Appendix Figure F1 we show the original percentiles, without normalizing them to zero in 2005.
5In Appendix Figures F2 and F3 we report Pareto tail coefficients, by gender, estimated on 1% and 5%
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Figure 2: Percentiles of the distribution of log annu l earnings










































































































No es: CS samp , percentiles of log annual earnings, by gender. All p rcentiles are normalized to 0 in 2005.
The shaded areas indicate recession years.
duri g that period. Despite data differences, hi suggests that the recent stability in the
upp r part of th distributio migh not be a long-run pheno enon.
In Figure 3 we show various measures of inequality, by gender and over time.6 In the top
graphs, we focus on overall inequality, as measured by the P90-P10 percentile difference in
log annual earnings, as well as by the standard deviation of log annual earnings — suitably
scaled in order to facilitate comparability with the P90-P10 measure. The two measures
6In Appendix Figure F4 we show the evolution in the overall population, pooling both genders. In Appendix
Figures F5 and F6 we show the results controlling for age, and for age and education, respectively.
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Notes: CS sample, log annual earnings. In the top graphs, the P90-P10 difference is indicated in squares,
and the rescaled standard deviation is indicated in circles (using a scaling factor of 2.56, in order to facilitate
comparison between the two measures). In the bottom graph , the P90-P50 differenc is indicated in squares,
and the P50-P10 difference is indicated in circles. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
of inequality give a consi tent ssage. For males, inequality increases substantially with
the recession, and decreases afterwards. The magnitudes of the fluctuations are substantial.
Indeed, the P90-P10 measure increases by 0.7 between 2007 and 2013. For females, the
inequality increase associated with the recession is more moderate, with an increase of less
than 0.2.
In the bottom graphs of Figure 3 we focus on upper and lower inequality, as measured
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of inequality give a consistent message. For males, inequality increases substantially with
the recession, and decreases afterwards. The magnitudes of the fluctuations are substantial.
Indeed, the P90-P10 measure increases by 0.7 between 2007 and 2013. For females, the
inequality increase associated with the recession is more moderate, with an increase of less
than 0.2.
In the bottom graphs of Figure 3 we focus on upper and lower inequality, as measured
11
by the percentile differences P90-P50 and P50-P10, respectively. For males, inequality in
the bottom part of the earnings distribution increases sharply around the recession: indeed,
the P50-P10 measure increases by 0.7 between 2007 and 2013. In contrast, upper inequality
as measured by the P90-P50 difference is approximately flat over the entire period. This
is consistent with the findings of Bonhomme and Hospido (2017), who emphasize the role
of sectors, and in particular construction, in the evolution of male inequality in Spain. For
females, the P50-P10 also increases in the recession, albeit much less so than for males, and
upper inequality is also approximately constant over the period.7
When interpreting these features of the Spanish earnings distribution, it is important to
take into account the large fluctuations in unemployment over the period. In the second part
of the paper we will consider a broader sample, including unemployed individuals with zero
labor earnings in a year. As an additional exercise, we have computed measures of inequality
based on an income measure that combines labor earnings and unemployment benefits, while
keeping the same sample as in the rest of this section. The results show little difference
relative to only using labor earnings.8
3.2 Income changes
We next turn to the distribution of earnings changes and its evolution. For this purpose,
we first focus on the LS sample, and construct residualized log earnings εit = log yit − x′itβ̂,
where xit includes fully-saturated interactions of age dummies, gender and year indicators,
and β̂ is a regression coefficient, as well as their one-year changes git = ∆εit = εit+1 − εit.
We will also refer to multiple-year changes such as g5it = ∆
5εit = εit+5 − εit.
In Figure 4 we start by documenting the evolution over time of percentiles of one-year log
earnings changes.9 All percentiles are relative to the reference year 2005. The top left graph,
for males, shows a sharp contrast between the 10th percentile and the other percentiles.
Indeed, while most percentiles of log earnings changes increase somewhat over the period,
7In Appendix Figure F7 we report the income shares of various percentiles. We find that the share of the
bottom 50% decreases substantially around the recession (by 25%), whereas the top 1% remains approximately
stable.
8See Appendix Figure F8. Another notable aspect of the Spanish economy in this period is the increase
in the percentage of immigrants. In Appendix Figure F9 we report earnings percentiles and inequality in a
sample without immigrants, and find similar results to the ones based on the sample with immigrants.
9In Appendix Figures F10 and F11 we show the densities of one-year and five-year log annual earnings
changes, respectively. In Appendix Figures F12 and F13 we show the corresponding log densities.
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3.1 Income inequality
In Figure 2 we start by showing percentiles of log real earnings, by gender, from 2005 to
2018, taking 2005 as the reference year.4 In the top two graphs, we show the 10th, 25th,
median, 75th, and 90th percentiles for males and females, respectively. While the evolution of
earnings percentiles over the period shows that earnings inequality increases in the recession,
it also highlights a contrast between males and females. For males, earnings percentiles
above the median vary little during the period, however the 10th and 25th percentiles drop
sharply during the great recession, and only start to recover after 2013. As a result, earnings
inequality increases in the recession. This confirms the finding documented in Bonhomme
and Hospido (2017). For females, we observe a similar pattern, albeit quantitatively much
less pronounced, in line with the findings of Bonhomme and Hospido (2013) on the first part
of the period.
In the bottom two graphs of Figure 2 we show various percentiles at the top of the distri-
bution of log annual earnings, up to the 99.5th percentile. For both genders, top percentiles
tend to decrease between 2009 and 2013. However, this decrease is quantitatively small. In
addition, the graphs show that all percentiles above the 90th tend to evolve similarly over
the period. This suggests that, in Spain, the recession did not affect top labor incomes ( .e.,
99th percentile and above) differently from the rest of the top decile. Note that, due to
relatively small sample sizes, we are not able to reliably document the evolution of earnings
percentiles above the 99.5th in the MCVL. Note also that, given our data, we only include
labor earnings, and do not account for capital income in the analysis.
The stability over time of the upper part of the Spanish income distribution, including
the right tail, stands in contrast with the experience of other countries, such as the US and
the UK (Piketty and Saez, 2013).5 For Spain, this evidence is consistent with results from
survey data in recent years (Anghel et al., 2018). Using top coded administrative records and
extrapolation, Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) found that the P90-P50 percentile difference
increased substantially between 1988 and 1996, explaining most of the increase in inequality
4 i F1 we show the original percentiles, with ut norm lizing them to zero in 2005.
5In Appendix Figures F2 a F3 we report Pareto tail coefficients, by gender, estimated on 1% and 5%
of the sample, respectively. We find that the tail coefficients are approximately similar in 2005 and 2015, for
both genders.
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Figure 4: One-year cha ges in log earnings, percentiles and dispersion
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in residualized log earnings. In the upper panel, all percentiles are
normalized to 0 in 2005. In the l wer panel, dispersion measured by P90 − P10. The shaded areas dic t
recession years.
the 10th percentile decre ses sharply around the recessio . Moreover, as the comparison to
the right graph shows, this evolution is not as pronounced for females.10 In the lower panel
of Figure 4 we show the P90-P10 percentile difference of log earnings changes, alongside the
standard deviation, rescaled for comparability. We find that the dispersion of log earnings
changes increases at the beginning of the recession, especially for males.11
10In Appendix Figure F14 we focus on percentiles of log earnings changes above the 90th percentile. We
see that the top percentiles tend to move approximately in parallel for both genders.
11In Appendix Figure F15 we document the dispersion of five-year log earnings changes.
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in residualized log earnings. Kelley skewness is P90−2P50+P10
P90−P10 . The
shaded areas indicate recession years.
While in Figure 4 we focus on one-year changes, it is also informative to document changes
over long periods. To do so, we compute cumulative earnings changes around the recession,
between 2006 and 2014, net of age effects. We find that the distribution of earnings changes
over the long period is widely dispersed. While, for males, the 90th percentile of 2006-2014
log-earnings changes is +62%, the 10th percentile is -93%. For females, the corresponding
90th and 10th percentiles are +77% and -77%, respectively.12
12In Appendix Figure F16 we plot the cumulative earnings changes between 2006 and 2014, against initial
earnings percentiles in 2006. The figure shows that the dispersion of log earnings changes in the long period
tends to decrease with the level of initial earnings.
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in residualized log earnings. In the upper panel, all percentiles are
normalized to 0 in 2005. In the lower panel, dispersion measured by P90 − P10. The shaded areas indicate
recession years.
the 10th percentile decreases sharply around the recession. Moreover, as the comparison to
the right graph shows, this evolution is not as pronounced for females.10 In the lower panel
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in residualized log earnings. In the upper panel, all percentiles are
normalized to 0 in 2005. In the lower panel, dispersion measured by P90 − P10. The shaded areas indicate
recession years.
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shaded areas indicate recession years.
While in Figure 4 we focus on one-year changes, it is also informative to document changes
over long periods. To do so, we compute cumulative earnings changes around the recession,
between 2006 and 2014, net of age effects. We find that the distribution of earnings changes
over the long period is widely dispersed. While, for males, the 90th percentile of 2006-2014
log-earnings changes is +62%, the 10th percentile is -93%. For females, the corresponding
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tends to decrease with the level of initial earnings.
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Recent work has documented the cyclical behavior of the skewness of log earnings changes
in the US (Guvenen et al., 2014) nd i other countries (e.g., Hoffmann and Malacrino, 2019,
Pora and Wilner, 2020, Busch et al., forthcoming). In the top panel of Figure 5 we show
the evolution over time of the Kelley measure of skewness of one-year log earnings changes.
We see that skewness becomes more negative in the recession, in agreement with the findings
of Guvenen et al. (2014) for the US and Busch et al. (forthcoming) for Germany, Sweden
and France. This evolution is more pronounced for males than for females. The changes in
skewness that we document for males are substantial by international standards.13
In the bottom panel of Figure 5 we show the P90-P50 and P50-P10 percentile differences,
which measure the upper and lower dispersion of the changes in one-year log earnings, respec-
tively. The dispersion of log earnings changes in the lower part f the distribution increases
during the recession, more so for males. The dispersion of log earnings changes in the upper
part of the distribution also increases, albeit the increase happens at the end of the recession
in this case, and it is most pronounced for males.
We are interested in relating the dispersion and skewness of log earnings changes to the
position of the individual in the earnings distribution. Arellano et al. (2017) and Guve-
nen et al. (forthcoming) find, using US data, that the dispersion and skewness of income
depend on past income. Such measures of conditional dispersion and skewness are particu-
larly relevant to us, given our goal of documenting income risk. Following Guvenen et al.
(forthcoming), we construct a measure of “permanent” earnings as Pit = (yit−2 + yit−1 +
yit)/
(∑2
τ=0 1{yit−τ ≥ yt−τ}
)
, computed only for those whose earnings are above the thresh-
old y
t
in at least two of the past three years. We also construct residualized log permanent
earnings εPit .
In Figure 6 we show several measures of dispersion, skewness and kurtosis of one-year log
earnings changes, by gender, conditional on lagged residualized log permanent earnings.14
In the top graphs, we find that the dispersion of log earnings decreases with the level of
permanent earnings. Dispersion only increases slightly, for males, at the top levels of perma-
13In Appendix Figure F17 we report results based on a moment-based measure of skewness, and find similar
results to the ones obtained using the Kelley measure. We also report results for kurtosis, however those are
less consistent since quantile-based and moment-based measures disagree to a large extent in this case.
14In Appendix Figure F19 we report the corresponding moment-based measures of dispersion, skewness,
and kurtosis.
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Notes: H sample, one-year changes in residualized log earnings. On the x-axis we report percentiles of residu-
alized log permanent earnings εPit−1. In the top panel we show the P90-P10 percentile difference, in the middle
panel we show Kelley skewness, and in the bottom panel we show excess Crow-Siddiqui kurtosis. The various
curves on the graphs corresponds to various age groups: between 25 and 34 years, between 35 and 44, and
between 45 and 55 years, respectively.
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nent incomes reported on the graph, which correspond to the 99.5 percentile. While sample
sizes prevent us from drawing firm conclusions above this level, we checked that dispersion
increases somewhat more steeply for the top 0.5%. Moreover, conditional dispersion tends to
decrease over the life cycle, for both males and females. The conditional standard deviation
of log income given past income may be interpreted as a measure of income risk. In the
second part of the paper, we will compare this measure with a prediction-based approach for
a broader income measure.
Lastly, in the middle and bottom panels of Figure 6 we show the skewness and kurtosis
of one-year log earnings changes, by gender, conditional on permanent earnings Pit. The
quantile-based measures of higher-order features of the distribution of log earnings suggest
that, for both genders, skewness is more negative and excess kurtosis is higher in the middle
of the earnings distribution.
3.3 Age profiles and income persistence
In this last part on income inequality and dynamics, we focus on inequality by cohort and
age groups, and on earnings persistence and mobility. In the upper panel of Figure 7 we
report the P90-P10, P90-P50, and P50-P10 percentile differences at age 25, by gender, from
2005 to 2018.15 The results show that, for both genders, inequality in the upper part of the
distribution increases during the recession. This pattern for younger workers, which contrasts
with the evolution of upper inequality in the whole sample that we documented in Figure 3,
reflects in part a fall in median log earnings for young workers during the recession.
Next, in the lower panel of Figure 7 we compare earnings profiles for different cohorts over
time. For both males and females, the cohorts of workers who started during the recession
have a substantially lower initial level, compared to the cohorts who started in 2005, however
their subsequent earnings profile is steeper.16
Finally, for the purpose of understanding income dynamics it is also interesting to docu-
ment to which extent current earnings are associated with future earnings. Pijoan-Mas and
Sánchez-Marcos (2010) and Alvarez and Arellano (2021) estimate earnings processes using
survey data. Here we report simple measures of earnings mobility based on our administrative
15In Appendix Figure F25 we show percentiles of log annual earnings at age 25.
16In Appendix Figure F26 we show earnings inequality.
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Figure 7: Inequality and age profiles for young workers
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Notes: CS sample, log annual earnings. In the top panel the sample is restricted to age-25 workers only. In
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sample. In Figure 8 we report 10-year average ra k-rank mobility for two age groups: 25-34
and 35-44. The figure shows reversion towards the mean, and relatively small changes with
age. There is upward mobility for those at the bottom of the permanent income distribution,
and downward mobility for those at the top of the distribution. These patterns are similar
for males and females, and more pronounced for the young.17
17In Appendix Figures F22, F23, and F24, we show mobility over the life cycle, over time, and at a 10-year
horizon, respectively.
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Figure 8: Evolution of 10-year earnings mobility over the life cycle
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where P ait = (yit + yit−1 + yit−2)/3, for individuals with non-missing earnings yit, yit−1, yit−2 for whom at
least one of them is above the threshold. This figure shows average rank-rank 10-year earnings mobility. The
various curves on the graph correspond to different age groups measured at time t: solid corresponds to 25-
34 and dashed corresponds to 35-44. The squares and diamonds correspond to the top 0.5 percentile of the
distribution of permanent income at t.
4 Measuring income risk
In the second part of the paper we now study income risk and income risk inequality in
Spain. We first describe how we measure inequality in income risk. In the empirical analysis,
we extend the notion of earnings to include observations below the income threshold y
t
that
we used in the first part of the paper, including zeros, as well as unemployment benefits.
Including both sources of income provides a closer approximation to the income risk faced
by individuals when making consumption and investment plans. We envisage an individual
that factors in employment transitions within the year and takes both sources of income into
account when forming expectations of her income over the next year. In this section and the
next we restrict the analysis to males.
4.1 A CV measure of income risk
Our goal is to produce summary measures of the uncertainty of an individual agent’s one-year-
ahead predictive income distribution. We propose to mimic the agent’s prediction problem as
19
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closely as we can, using the administrative records at our disposal. We target the distribution
of income levels Yit given predictors Xit, which we conceive are predictors also considered by
the agent.
We use both micro and macro predictors in Xit. The micro predictors include a cubic
polynomial in past log labor income, log Yit−1, interacted with an indicator that Yit−1 is
positive; the log of income from unemployment benefits at t−1; an indicator that income from
unemployment benefits is positive; the number of days worked in t−1; dummy variables that
indicate working full year at t−1, t−2, and t−3; an indicator for full-time employment status
in the main job (defined as the job spell that contributes the largest fraction to total annual
earnings); an indicator for permanent contract of the main job; and indicators of educational
attainment. We have also tried a larger set of predictors including firm- and family-related
variables (firm size, industry, and family size), finding qualitatively and quantitatively similar
results to the ones we report below. In some specifications, we will augment this list to include
unobserved heterogeneity (discussed in Appendix B.3). We interact all micro predictors with
a quadratic in age.
In turn, the macro predictors include GDP growth and unemployment rate at t − 1,
t − 2, and t − 3, at the national and provincial level, as well as their interactions with
age. We use aggregate covariates such as GDP growth and unemployment in an attempt
to mimic the agent’s information set in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. Alternatively,
one could assume perfect foresight about next year’s macroeconomic conditions, and estimate
risk models with time-varying parameters. Given that aggregate conditions end up playing a
small quantitative role in our results, following such an approach does not materially affect
any of the conclusions below.
We propose to measure income risk using the following coefficient of variation (CV here-
after):
CV(Xit) =
mean absolute deviation︷ ︸︸ ︷
E (|Yit − E(Yit |Xit)| |Xit)
E(Yit |Xit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mean
. (1)
The CV is a ratio between two measures: the mean absolute deviation, which is a measure
of dispersion of the predictive distribution of income, and the mean, which is a measure of
20
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location. In words, an individual with an expected income of 20,000 euros and a CV of 0.1
expects a deviation of her next year’s income from its mean of ±2000 euros.
We use the mean absolute deviation instead of the standard deviation in the numerator
to minimize sensitivity to extreme observations. A rescaled version of CV(Xit) is directly
comparable to the usual coefficient of variation that has the standard deviation in the nu-
merator, the scaling factor being
√
π
2 ≈ 1.25. When the CV is small, it is approximately




π Std(log(Yit)|Xit). However, unlike the standard deviation of log income,
the CV remains well-defined when Yit = 0. We will also report results based on other robust
counterparts to CV, using the conditional median instead of the mean.
Discussion. To assess the magnitude of the risk measures that we report, we find it infor-
mative to provide a simple welfare interpretation in the spirit of Lucas (1987). To do so, we
approximate the welfare gain to an individual associated with fully eliminating the income





consumption Cit = λ(Xit)Yit for some proportionality factor λ(Xit). Suppose also that Yit
given Xit is log-normally distributed. The welfare gain of eliminating income risk faced by i
at t can then be approximated in percentage of consumption as




Welfare gain ≈ π
4
× θi × CV(Xit)2, (2)
where CV(Xit) is given by (1). Based on this calculation, we would interpret a CV value
lower than 0.1 as reflecting relatively low individual income risk (e.g., corresponding to less
than 2% of consumption when θi = 2), whereas values of 0.3 or higher correspond to sub-
stantial amounts of risk that can potentially impact individual welfare in major ways (e.g.,
corresponding to more than 14% of consumption when θi = 2).
An important limitation of this derivation is that it relies on income being conditionally
log-normal. As we documented in the first part of the paper, log-normality may not be a
good approximation in our setting. In this case, conditional higher-order moments of income
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such as skewness and kurtosis will also matter in order to assess the welfare gains associated
with eliminating income risk. As a result, the CV will not necessarily accurately measure
the income risk faced by individuals, possibly underestimating it. Extending our approach
to estimate the full conditional distribution of income, as we mention in Subsection 5.3 and
detail in Appendix B, it is in principle possible to compute the welfare gains of eliminating
risk given individual preferences. Although we do not pursue this possibility here, we will
also report quantile-based risk measures as a complement to the CV.
Another limitation of the above welfare calculation is that it relies on a specific, possibly
restrictive form for individual preferences. To illustrate, suppose the individual’s utility
function takes a Stone-Geary form, Ui(Cit) =
(Cit−Cm)1−θi−1
1−θi , where Cm is a subsistence
consumption level. In Appendix A we show that, if Cit − Cm is log-normal, and using the
same approximation as in (2), the welfare gain of eliminating income risk can be approximated
as






Hence, for non-negligible values of Cm/E(Cit |Xit) — e.g., for individuals whose average
consumption is close to the subsistence level — the squared CV underestimates the welfare
cost of income risk. Moreover, given our empirical finding that risk and income are negatively
correlated, a CV-based measure will then tend to underestimate the degree of income risk
inequality.
Lastly, it is important to note that, since the CV is based on a predictive income distri-
bution, its interpretation hinges on the chosen predictors. While we attempt to mimic the
agent’s information set using the administrative data, it is of course possible that the agent’s
information does not coincide with the set of predictors that we rely on. This fundamental
challenge in risk measurement will motivate us to consider specifications with different sets
of observed and unobserved predictors. In addition, we will use Spanish civil servants as a
convenient test sample that we expect to face very low income risk, and we will compare our
prediction-based risk measures with estimates based on subjective expectations.
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4.2 Income risk: econometric approach
Estimating the numerator and denominator of the coefficient of variation in (1) requires
performing two prediction tasks. Here we describe a simple and parsimonious approach to
predict income and quantify income risk. In Section 5.3 we will describe several extensions
of this approach, and report results based on them.
Since income is non-negative, a parametric estimator can be based on the two following
exponential specifications:
E(Yit|Xit) = exp(X ′itβ),
and
E (|Yit − E(Yit |Xit)| |Xit) = exp(X ′itγ),
where Xit includes all the micro and macro predictors that we listed in the previous sub-
section. We estimate β and γ using two Poisson regressions.18 First, we regress Yit on Xit,
which gives us β̂. To alleviate issues related to outliers in the prediction of the conditional
mean, we censor the upper tail of predicted values at the maximum value of total income in
the data, which only affects a handful of observations. Then, we regress |Yit − exp(X ′itβ̂)| on
Xit, which gives us γ̂. Finally, given estimates β̂ and γ̂, we compute our estimate of the risk
faced by individual i in year t as
ĈVit = exp
(
X ′it(γ̂ − β̂)
)
. (4)
In the next section, we will document several key features of the distribution of income
risk and income risk inequality, based on our risk measure ĈVit. Before doing so, we perform
two exercises in order to better understand what ĈVit measures. The first exercise is a
quantification of prediction performance associated with the two tasks of predicting income
absolute deviations (to estimate the numerator of CV), and predicting income levels (to
estimate the denominator of CV). We document in-sample performance using data for the
years 2006-2017. In addition, we document out-of-sample performance using data for the
years 2006-2017 as our estimation sample and data for 2018 as our hold-out sample. Note
that this exercise measures prediction performance for a given set of predictors, so accurate
prediction need not imply that we correctly capture the income risk that agents face.
18We found Poisson estimates to be more numerically stable than estimates from exponential regressions.
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two exercises in order to better understand what ĈVit measures. The first exercise is a
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Table 1: Prediction performance
(a) Mean (CV denominator)
In sample Out of sample
Income +Days +Days+Age All Income +Days +Days+Age All
MSE 23027126 22857682 22708526 21391777 19464323 19626672 19392590 20010842
MAE 3007 3003 3002 3058 2770 2790 2771 2938
Log-lik 221363 221369 221383 221483 224057 224044 224056 224189
(b) Absolute deviation (CV numerator)
In sample Out of sample
Income +Days +Days+Age All Income +Days +Days+Age All
MSE 12956397 12313304 12014627 10219270 12723757 11272098 11028598 9714735
MAE 2734 2484 2427 2200 2768 2410 2337 2211
Log-lik 25953 26380 26447 26777 25121 25646 25709 26043
Notes: B sample. MSE is mean squared error, with 99th percentile trimmed. MAE is mean absolute error, with
99th percentile trimmed. Log-lik is the log likelihood value divided by the number of observations. Exponential
regression models, using lagged log income and an indicator of past income being zero (“Income”), adding days
worked in the year (“+Days”), adding days worked and age (“+Days+Age”), and using all micro and macro
predictors (“All”). In sample is for 2006-2017. Out of sample is for 2018. The bottom panel corresponds to
performance in the prediction of the absolute deviation, using the “All” specification as the estimate for the
mean to maintain comparability between columns.
We compare four specifications: (1) only using as predictors income lagged one year and
the indicator that income is positive, (2) adding the number of days worked, (3) adding age
to income and days worked, and (4) including all the micro and macro predictors that we
listed in the previous subsection. In Table 1 we report the mean squared error (MSE) and
the mean absolute error (MAE), both trimmed at the 99th percentile in order to reduce
sensitivity to extreme observations, as well as the average log likelihood value (Log-lik) of
the Poisson model. In the top panel we focus on the prediction of income levels, and in
the bottom panel we show the results for the prediction of income absolute deviations —
in which case we assess the prediction for |Yit − exp(X ′itβ̂)|, where β̂ is estimated based on
the 2005-2017 sample using the most comprehensive specification. We see that, while the
various specifications perform similarly in sample and out of sample to predict income levels
(top panel), adding other predictors beyond lagged income tends to improve the prediction
of income absolute deviations (bottom panel).
In the second exercise, we attempt to document the main sources of variation in the CV
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Table 2: Explaining the variation in CV
Age categories
26-30 36-40 46-50
Business cycle 0.0205 0.0077 0.0076
Permanent (t-1) 0.0019 0.0008 0.0001
Full time (t-1) 0.0168 0.0117 0.0082
Days worked (t-1) 0.6937 0.4512 0.3519
Income (t-1) 0.0014 0.0013 0.0000
Notes: B sample. Partial R2 in linear regressions of ĈVit on various determinants. Exponential specification
that includes all macro and micro predictors. “Business cycle” includes the macro predictors, i.e., GDP growth
and unemployment rate at t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3 at the national and provincial level.
risk measure, using regressions. Specifically, we regress ĈVit in (4) on five sets of covariates,
and we report the partial R2 coefficients associated with each of them. In Table 2 we show the
results, split by age categories. The sets of covariates are: an indicator of permanent labor
contract, an indicator of full-time labor contract, the number of days worked, and the income
level (all of them lagged), and our macro indicators. We see that the number of days worked
in the past year explains the largest part of the variation in the CV. Net of the impact of days
worked, the macro indicators, the features of the labor contract, and the income level, all
have low explanatory power. The Spanish economy experiences high levels of unemployment
and employment turnover related to the large share of short-term temporary employment.
The partial R2 coefficients in Table 2 suggest that these features contribute substantially to
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Table 2: Explaining the variation in CV
Age categories
26-30 36-40 46-50
Business cycle 0.0205 0.0077 0.0076
Permanent (t-1) 0.0019 0.0008 0.0001
Full time (t-1) 0.0168 0.0117 0.0082
Days worked (t-1) 0.6937 0.4512 0.3519
Income (t-1) 0.0014 0.0013 0.0000
Notes: B sample. Partial R2 in linear regressions of ĈVit on various determinants. Exponential specification
that includes all macro and micro predictors. “Business cycle” includes the macro predictors, i.e., GDP growth
and unemployment rate at t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3 at the national and provincial level.
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Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors. The shaded areas indicate
recession years.
5.1 Income risk inequality over the period
In Figure 9 we show the evolution of different percentiles of CV over time. In Table 3 we
report selected quantiles of the income risk distribution over time, as well as various measures
of income risk inequality.19 We see that both the level and evolution of income risk vary very
differently along the distribution. The lower part of the income risk distribution corresponds
to CV values of at most 0.12. This suggests that at least half of the Spanish economy faces
little uncertainty in their future income. In addition, for this part of the sample, risk levels
stay remarkably constant over the period. In contrast, the 75th and 90th percentiles of income
risk have large CV values, and those vary widely over the period: the 75th (respectively, the
90th) percentile ranges between 0.3 (resp., 0.7) at the beginning of the period and 0.5 (resp.,
1.2) at the end of the recession
As a result, inequality in income risk tends to increase in the recession. As shown by the
left panel of Figure 10, while median risk remains constant during the entire period, income
19In Appendix Figure G1 we report the coefficient estimates that we use to construct our CV.
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Table 3: Income risk over the period, in numbers
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
P90/P10 8.94 5.26 5.69 5.76 6.70 8.90 9.50 10.42 11.97 12.58 11.43 10.15 9.15 8.09
P90/P50 6.03 3.87 4.07 4.06 4.74 6.05 6.30 6.75 7.53 7.75 7.15 6.48 6.13 5.51
P50/P10 1.48 1.36 1.40 1.42 1.41 1.47 1.51 1.55 1.59 1.62 1.60 1.57 1.49 1.47
p10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
p25 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
p50 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
p75 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.32
p90 0.69 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.54 0.68 0.71 0.81 0.91 0.93 0.85 0.75 0.71 0.63
Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors.
Figure 10: Income risk inequality over the period














































No es: B sample. Exponential sp cification, using all macro and micro predictors. The shaded areas dicat
recession years.
risk inequality — as measured by the P90/P10 ratio — increases substantially during the
recession, with a more than threefold increase between 2006 and 2013. This evolution is
qualitatively in line with the one of earnings inequality, see Figure 3. However, as shown by
the right panel of Figure 10, in the case of income risk inequality, the changes happen at the
top of the income risk distribution. Indeed, the P90/P50 percentile ratio of CV increases by
more than 2 with the recession, whereas the P50/P10 ratio remains approximately constant.
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risk inequality — as measured by the P90/P10 ratio — increases substantially during the
recession, with a more than threefold increase between 2006 and 2013. This evolution is
qualitatively in line with the one of earnings inequality, see Figure 3. However, as shown by
the right panel of Figure 10, in the case of income risk inequality, the changes happen at the
top of the income risk distribution. Indeed, the P90/P50 percentile ratio of CV increases by
more than 2 with the recession, whereas the P50/P10 ratio remains approximately constant.
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5.2 Correlates of income risk
We next turn to documenting several features of income risk and income risk inequality. We
start by studying variation over the life cycle. In the upper left graph of Figure 11 we show
the percentiles of CV by age. We find that younger individuals (less than 30 years old) tend
to face higher levels of income risk. In addition, younger individuals face larger risk dispersion
than older individuals.
In order to illustrate the magnitude of the life-cycle variation in income risk, in Table 4
we report the ratio of age-specific percentiles of CV to the unconditional percentiles, by age.
For example, the third row shows that, at the median, 25-year-olds experience almost three
times as much risk — as measured by CV — compared to 35-year-olds. These patterns show
remarkable variation in income risk and income risk inequality over the life cycle.
We next study how income risk and income risk inequality vary along the income dis-
tribution. For this purpose, in the upper right graph of Figure 11 we plot percentiles of
CV as a function of lagged income percentiles. To produce the graph, we bin income into
50 categories, where the first category corresponds to zero income. We see a clear negative
relationship between income and income risk. In addition, while high-income individuals face
low levels and a small dispersion of income risk, individuals at the bottom of the income
distribution face not only higher average income risk, but also a higher dispersion of CV.
It is interesting to compare our income risk measure with the income-based measures that
we reported in the first part of this paper. Indeed, in Section 3 we documented several features
of the dispersion of earnings changes conditional on lagged income. In order to compare such
a measure to our CV, in Figure 12 we compare the distribution of income risk as measured by
the CV, to the distribution of the conditional standard deviation of log income given lagged
income. For the purpose of this comparison, we restrict the sample to positive income, and
we rescale the standard deviation so as to make it comparable to the CV.20 Compared to the
conditional standard deviation of log income, the CV implies a larger proportion of low risk
in the data, while also showing a long right tail, pointing to a substantial part of the economy
facing high uncertainty in future income. Indeed, compared to the density of the conditional
20In Appendix Tables F11 and F12, we report summary statistics of the B sample conditional on positive
income in 2018 euros and 2018 US dollars, respectively.
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risk inequality — as measured by the P90/P10 ratio — increases substantially during the
recession, with a more than threefold increase between 2006 and 2013. This evolution is
qualitatively in line with the one of earnings inequality, see Figure 3. However, as shown by
the right panel of Figure 10, in the case of income risk inequality, the changes happen at the
top of the income risk distribution. Indeed, the P90/P50 percentile ratio of CV increases by
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Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors.
standard deviation, the density of CV is more skewed to the right and has a larger mass of
observations near zero.21
Another key determinant of income risk is past employment. In the lower left graph of
Figure 11 we show how the CV depends on the days worked in the past year. The graph
shows a clear decreasing relationship between days worked and income risk. Individuals
21In Appendix Figure G1 we compare various conditional percentiles of CV with the conditional standard
deviation Std(log(Yit)|Yit−1), as a function of lagged income percentiles. The conditional standard deviation
of log income suggests a level of risk that is close to the 90th percentile of risk implied by our CV. In addition,
for any income level, our CV implies additional risk heterogeneity compared to the standard deviation of log
income.
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Table 4: Relative percentiles of income risk by age
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
P1010 1.55 1.29 1.13 1.03 0.97 0.94 0.95
P2525 1.67 1.30 1.10 0.99 0.93 0.90 0.91
P5050 2.61 1.28 1.00 0.86 0.78 0.75 0.75
P7575 1.76 1.10 0.92 0.86 0.87 0.96 1.10
P9090 1.51 1.16 1.02 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.79
Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors. We report the relative
percentiles Pττ = Qτ (CVit|age)/Qτ (CVit), where Qτ (CVit|age) is the τ th conditional percentile of CV given
age, and Qτ (CVit) is the τ th unconditional percentile of CV.











Notes: B sample, with positive income. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors. We
compare the CV with a rescaled conditional standard deviation of log income. The correlation coefficient is
computed after trimming the 99th percentiles of both measures.
working l ss than half the year face substantially higher risk, and a higher dispersion of risk.
Indiv duals working full year face low risk and li tle risk dispe ion.
As a fourth dimension of income risk, we next study its persistence at the individual level.
In the lower right graph of Figure 11 we show how, for a given individual i, ĈVit and ĈVit−1
relate to each other. We see that, when current risk CV is below the median, it is highly
likely that the CV in the following year will be low.22 This suggests that more than half of
22In addition, risk persistence tends to increase with age, as we show in Appendix Figure G2.
30
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2136
Table 4: Relative percentiles of income risk by age
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
P1010 1.55 1.29 1.13 1.03 0.97 0.94 0.95
P2525 1.67 1.30 1.10 0.99 0.93 0.90 0.91
P5050 2.61 1.28 1.00 0.86 0.78 0.75 0.75
P7575 1.76 1.10 0.92 0.86 0.87 0.96 1.10
P9090 1.51 1.16 1.02 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.79
Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors. We report the relative
percentiles Pττ = Qτ (CVit|age)/Qτ (CVit), where Qτ (CVit|age) is the τ th conditional percentile of CV given
age, and Qτ (CVit) is the τ th unconditional percentile of CV.











Notes: B sample, with positive income. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors. We
compare the CV with a rescaled conditional standard deviation of log income. The correlation coefficient is
computed after trimming the 99th percentiles of both measures.
working less than half the year face substantially higher risk, and a higher dispersion of risk.
Individuals working full year face low risk and little risk dispersion.
As a fourth dimension of income risk, we next study its persistence at the individual level.
In the lower right graph of Figure 11 we show how, for a given individual i, ĈVit and ĈVit−1
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working less than half the year face substantially higher risk, and a higher dispersi n of risk.
Individuals working full year face low risk and little risk dispersion.
As a fourth dimension of income risk, we next study its persistence at the individual level.
In the lower right graph of Figure 11 we show how, for a given individual i, ĈVit and ĈVit−1
relate to each other. We see that, when current risk CV is below the median, it is highly
likely that the CV in the following year will be low.22 This suggests that more than half of
22In addition, risk persistence tends to increase with age, as we show in Appendix Figure G2.
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the Spanish economy is effectively shi lded from income risk, at l ast in th short run. In
contrast, current CV values exceeding the 60th percentile are associated with high CV values
in the following period. Both the level and dispersion of future CV i crease with current CV.
5.3 Robustness checks and extensions
Here we summariz results on income risk and i come risk inequality, based on several alter-
native income measures and estimation techniques (details can be found in Appendix B). We
produce risk estimates that accounts for income taxes. Moreover, we probe the robustness of
of our results by extending our baseline specification in two ways. We first estimate the CV
using neural networks, instead of the low-dimensional exponential specifications that we rely
on for our main results. Second, we augment the set of predictors by including unobserved
heterogeneity types in the specification, following the two-step grouped fixed-effects approach
of Bonhomme et al. (2021). Lastly, we report results based on a median-based counterpart
of the CV, in an attempt to minimize the impact of outliers. In all these specifications we
obtain results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our main results. As a last
extension, we use quantile regressions estimate the entire conditional distribution of income
given the predictors.23
5.4 The income risk for civil servants
In this subsection we consider a particular category of workers, civil servants (funcionarios),
as a convenient test case of the ability of our administrative records-based CV measure to
correctly represent the risk individuals face. In Spain, as in other countries, civil servants
are known to enjoy high levels of job and income security (see Antón and Muñoz de Bustillo,
2015). Thus, we expect them to face low income risk. In Figure 13 we plot the distribution of
the CV for civil servants under permanent contracts.24 The income risk levels we find are low
compared to the rest of the economy: indeed, the 90th percentile of CV among civil servants
is comparable to the median of the overall CV distribution. Moreover, the distribution is
virtually unaffected by the recession. We interpret this exercise as suggesting that, for the
23We use this approach to document the level and evolution of the skewness of the predictive income
distribution in Appendix Figure G17.
24In Appendix Table G8 we report the corresponding numbers.
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Notes: B sample, restricted to civil servants under permanent contracts. Exponential specifi-
cation, using all macro and micro predictors. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
subsample of workers in civil service jobs, the CV accurately captures the low level and low
variability of income risk that we would expect for contractual reasons.
6 Income risk: what do subjective expectations data say?
Our income risk measure is based on income and employment histories. However, the ad-
ministrative data has no direct information on the agent’s information set and beliefs. As
a complement, in this subsection we compare our CV with an income risk measure calcu-
lated from data on subjective income expectations. For this purpose, we use the subjective
probabilistic expectation question included in the Spanish Survey of Household Finances
(Encuesta Financiera de las Familias, EFF). The EFF is a longitudinal survey undertaken
by the Banco de España, which has been conducted since 2002 to obtain information about
the wealth and financial conditions of Spanish households. Based on this information, we
directly measure the uncertainty that households face about their future income growth by
obtaining a subjective standard deviation for each respondent. If there is a broad agreement
between the prediction-based measure and the subjective expectation-based measure, despite
the many differences in the way they are constructed, this will strengthen our confidence in
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both measures.
Starting in 2014, the EFF introduced a question to elicit household income probabilistic
expectations (Bover et al., 2018). Households were asked to distribute ten points among five
different scenarios concerning the change of their income over the next 12 months. In this
way, respondents provide information not only about point expectations, but also about the
probabilities they assign to different future outcomes. The exact wording is the following:
We are interested in knowing how you think the total annual income of your household
will change in the next 12 months. Divide 10 points among the five options given below,
assigning more points to the options you think are more likely (assign 0 point to options you
think are impossible):
Drop of more than 10%
Drop between 2% and 10%
Approximately steady (falls or rises of no more than 2%)
Increase between 2% and 10%
Increase of more than 10%
Thus, for every person who answered this question, we observe the fraction of points p̂j
allocated to each event j = 1, . . . , J (adding up to 1), where J = 5. From that information,
we calculate summary measures of dispersion under the assumption that the underlying
probabilities are normally distributed. We provide the details of the method in Appendix E.







to be regularized estimates of cumulative frequencies, and let
q̃j = Φ
−1 (1− c̃j) be the standard normal quantiles of the complementary frequencies. The
regularization parameter m can be thought of as a measure of the accuracy of the elicitation
process. For the results that we now present, we take m = 10 — and verified that using m




5 (q̃1 − q̃4) + 25 (q̃2 − q̃3)
.
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correctly represent the risk individuals face. In Spain, as in other countries, civil servants
are known to enjoy high levels of job and income security (see Antón and Muñoz de Bustillo,
2015). Thus, we expect them to face low income risk. In Figure 13 we plot the distribution of
the CV for civil servants under permanent contracts.24 The income risk levels we find are low
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virtually unaffected by the recession. We interpret this exercise as suggesting that, for the
23We use this approach to document the level and evolution of the skewnes of the predictive income
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Notes: Estimated subjective standard deviations from the EFF 2014.
For this exercise, we use data from the 2014 wave of the EFF. We select all male house-
hold heads, aged between 25 and 55 years, who responded to the question about subjective
expectations. A histogram of the standard deviation estimates σ̃ in the top graph of Figure
14 shows a large proportion of low subjective risk together with a long right tail. In the
bottom graphs of Figure 14 we show those standard deviation estimates by total income of
the household in the previous year (on the left) and by age (on the right). Even though there
are major differences in the way we capture income risk compared to our main analysis based
on the MCVL, the calculations based on the EFF are qualitatively consistent with several of
34
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the main lessons of the previous sections. Importantly, the subjective expectations question
in the EFF refers to household income, as opposed to individual income as in the MCVL
data.
The subjective standard deviations that we compute are close to 0.05 on average, which
is consistent with a large share of the sample facing relatively low levels of income risk.
Moreover, Figure 14 shows that there is substantial dispersion across households in terms
of subjective standard deviations, which is qualitatively consistent with the evidence from
the administrative data. In addition, similarly to what we obtained with our prediction-
based CV measure of income risk, the figure shows that subjective standard deviations are
higher in the bottom part of the income distribution, and also for younger household heads.
While there is a good overall qualitative agreement, subjective risk is somewhat muted by
comparison with MCVL risk. The nature of information extraction, the income concept,
and the operation of household insurance are some of the factors that may play a role in
explaining these differences.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a methodology for constructing measures of individual income risk and for
quantifying the inequality of income risk. We have documented a number of new empirical
facts regarding the dispersion, evolution, and dynamics of both income and income risk.
We have found evidence of high inequality of income security in the Spanish economy. A
large mass of workers with negligible risk in their incomes coexists with many who anticipate
fluctuations in their next year’s income larger than 10 or 20 percent of their expected incomes.
Additional key findings are that: (i) income risk is more unequal and higher on average among
the young; (ii) inequality of income risk increases during the recessions; (iii) risk decreases
with income, and (iv) lower levels of risk are more persistent than higher levels of risk. Beyond
income inequality, inequality of income risk is thus a key feature of the Spanish economy. It
would be of great interest to document it in other settings.
Some of the underlying causes of the inequality of income risk that we have documented
are familiar to the labor economists that studied Spanish unemployment and the consequences
of temporary/permanent dual labor markets. However, we have taken a different perspective
35
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that abstracts from shorter-term labor market transitions and puts the focus on the unequal
income risks that individuals face on a relevant time horizon.
The analysis could be extended in a number of directions. First, an open question is the
extent to which individual risks are mitigated at the household level, and how demographic
risks interact with income risks in the short and long run. Second, since different components
of income may have different degrees of persistence, it would be valuable to map our approach
into models with multiple latent components, which are key features of the permanent income
hypothesis and the literature on consumption insurance (Friedman, 1957, Hall and Mishkin,
1982, Blundell et al., 2008). Third, although we have not distinguished the sources of risk
that are exogenous to the agent from those that are the result of choice, this distinction is
important to account for example for labor market attachment and labor force participation.
Fourth, while we have only studied annual income risk, the MCVL administrative records
may also be useful to document within-year income fluctuations and their risk consequences
(Morduch and Schneider, 2019). Finally, an interesting direction will be to structurally
estimate the welfare costs of income risk, and the inequality of those economic costs, along
the lines of the discussion in Section 4.
References
Alvaredo, Facundo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman
(2017) “Global Inequality Dynamics: New Findings fromWID.world,” American Economic
Review, 107 (5), 404–09, 10.1257/aer.p20171095.
Alvarez, Javier and Manuel Arellano (2021) “Robust likelihood estimation of dynamic panel
data models,” Journal of Econometrics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2021.03.005.
Anghel, Brindusa, Henrique Basso, Olympia Bover, José Maŕıa Casado, Laura Hospido,
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Felgueroso, F., J. I. Garćıa-Pérez, M. Jansen, and D. Troncoso Ponce (2017). Recent trends
in the use of temporary contracts in Spain, Working Paper.
Friedman, M. (1957). A theory of the consumption function, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
Geweke, J., and M. Keane (2000). “An empirical analysis of earnings dynamics among men
in the PSID: 1968-1989”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 293-356.
Goodfellow, I., Y. Bengio, and A. Courville (2016). Deep Learning, MIT Press, https://
mitpress.mit.edu/books/deep-learning.
Gottschalk, P., and R. Moffitt (1994). “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the U.S. Labor
Market”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 217-272.
Gottschalk, P., and R. Moffitt (2009). “The Rising Instability of U.S. Earnings”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 3-24.
Guvenen, F., F. Karahan, S. Ozkan, and J. Song (forthcoming). “What do data on millions
of US workers reveal about life-cycle earnings”, Econometrica.
Guvenen, F., S. Ozkan, and J. Song (2014). “The Nature of Countercyclical Income Risk”,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 122, No. 3, pp. 621-660.
38
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 41 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2136
APPENDIX to
“Income Risk Inequality:
Evidence from Spanish Administrative Records”
A The welfare cost of income risk
Consider an individual with utility function Ui(Cit) =
(Cit−Cm)1−θi−1
1−θi , with consumption
Cit = λ(Xit)Yit for some proportionality factor λ(Xit). Suppose that
ln(Cit − Cm) |Xit = x ∼ N (µ(x), σ(x)2).
The individual is willing to give up a% of consumption each period in order to eliminate
income risk, where a solves
Ui(E(Cit |Xit)(1− a)) = E [Ui(Cit) |Xit] .



























































This implies (3), and (2) in the special case where Cm = 0.
1
B Robustness checks and extensions
B.1 After-tax income
In the main analysis, we have computed risk based on pre-tax income. In order to assess how
the tax system may affect our calculations of income risk, in this subsection we construct a
measure of after-tax income, and apply our approach to this measure.
We use administrative data on tax returns to estimate average effective tax rates with
respect to gross labor income. We apply these average effective tax rates to our measure of
income to calculate after-tax income. This approach follows Garcia-Miralles et al. (2019),
who estimate tax functions of the Spanish personal income tax. The data source we use
for this part is representative of the population of Spanish taxpayers. We have repeated
cross-sections available from 2005 to 2017. We select males aged 25-55, who file individual
tax returns. In the case of joint filing, it is not possible to distinguish the income that
corresponds to each household members. For each year and individual in the sample, we
compute gross labor income and tax liabilities. We compute effective tax rates as tax liabilities
over gross labor income. In all calculations, we restrict the sample to taxpayers with positive
gross labor income. We consider the income brackets set by the Government each year, and
calculate average effective tax rates within each interval. We report the income brackets and
corresponding average effective tax rates in Table G2. The simplified tax rules that we use
here give an approximately linear relationship between before-tax and after-tax income (see
Figure G3).
In Figure G5 we reproduce the main results from Section 5 using our CV calculated using
after-tax income. The top left panel shows the quantiles of CV, calculated using after-tax
income, over the sample period. The level and evolution of income risk are very similar
when using after-tax or before-tax income (compare with Figure 9). In Table G3 we report
the corresponding numbers, which are close to those in Table 3. In Figure G4 we see that
the percentiles of CV based on before-tax and after-tax income are very close to each other.
Moreover, the patterns of income risk over the life cycle, its relationship with income, and
its persistence, are all similar when using after-tax or before-tax income.
In contrast, the presence of unemployment benefits tends to dampen both the level and
2
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dispersion in income risk. This can be seen in Figure G6, where we reproduce the main
results from Section 5 using an income measure net of unemployment benefits.
B.2 Neural network CV
There are two reasons why our income risk inferences may be incorrect: the set of predictors
Xit may not correspond to the agent’s information set, or the prediction model may be
misspecified. Here we focus on the latter concern, and use a flexible prediction method,
instead of the exponential specification that we have relied on so far.
In order to make the prediction more flexible, we rely on a neural network to estimate the
CV. Consider the denominator of our CV, which is the conditional mean of income E(Yit|Xit).











where M is the number of nodes, τ is a nonlinear function, and βm and αm are parameters.
We model the numerator of CV similarly using the same τ function, and different number of
nodes and parameters.
Following the recent literature (e.g., Goodfellow et al., 2016), we take τ(u) = max(u, 0),
which corresponds to the “rectified linear unit” ReLU function. We use the Poisson loss
function. To choose the number of nodes M , we perform a single-fold cross-validation strat-
egy, using 2005-2016 as the estimation sample and 2017 as the hold-out sample. This gives
M = 8 nodes for estimating the mean (i.e., the CV denominator), and 7 nodes for estimating
the mean absolute deviation (i.e., the CV numerator).2 We focus on one-layer specifications
for parsimony,3 but we have performed some robustness checks using additional layers and
adding penalty terms.
In Figure G7 we reproduce some of our main findings, now based on neural network
specifications to construct the CV risk measure. In Table G4 we report the corresponding
2The neural network estimation was implemented in R with the package “H2O” (H2O.ai, 2020). The
Poisson loss function is minimized using a parallelized version of stochastic gradient descent. The default
parameters for the number of epochs is 10 and the number of training samples per iteration is adapted,
trading-off computation time and communication between parallel clusters.
3To reduce the variance in the predictions of the neural network of a given architecture, we run the
estimation algorithm on the full sample 15 times and average the corresponding predictions. To compare
estimates, we trim the 99th percentiles of the mean squared error.
3
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numb rs. Overall, the results based on the neural networks are quantitatively similar to t
b selin ones. In particular, we find that income risk inequality increases in he recession
that income risk is higher for the young and the low i come, and that it is highly persistent.
In Figure G8 we provide a direct comp rison between the CV computed using our baseline
exponential specification and the CV computed using a neural network approach. We see
that the densities of the two measures agree well, and that the two CV are highly correlated,
the correlation coefficient being 0.98.
B.3 Incorporating unobserved heterogeneity: grouped fixed-effects
To mimic the individual’s pr diction problem, it may be important to account for predictor
that we as researchers do not obs rve. In this subsection, we augment the set of predic ors
as (Xit, ξi), where ξi is latent component. For this purpose, we use a grouped fixed-effect
approach. Following Bonhomme et al. (2021) we first group indiv duals int K c t gories,
n then i clude the group indicators as predictors to estimate CV. We use different groups
for the conditional mean (the denominator) and the conditional mean absolute deviation
(the numerator). The benefit of th approach is the ability to handle incomplete models
without having to specify a model for the predetermined variables Xit, initial conditions,
and unobserved heterogeneity (Hahn an Kuersteiner, 2011, Arellano and Hahn, 2016).4 In
Secti n C we desc ibe implementati , and we provide descriptive informa ion about t
groups that we estimate.
In estimation, we take 4 groups for both the numerator and denominator of the CV.
We have experimented with different numbers of groups. Given the estimated groups, we
estimate the conditional mean and conditional mean absolute deviation of income Yit given
the observed predictors Xit and the groups using Poisson regressions, where we account for
interactions between the group indicators and a quadratic in age. As in the case with other
nonlinear fixed effects estimators, the consistency of the grouped fixed-effects approach re-
quires the number of time periods to tend to infinity together with the number of individuals.
To reduce the noise in the grouping, for this analysis we restrict the sample to individuals
with at least 4 observations prior to 2018.
4A rich parametric model of this kind is Altonji et al. (2013).
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In t e top left graph of Figure G11 we report the percentile of CV over the period,
obtained using the prediction method that allows for group-level heterogeneity. In Table G6
we provide the numbers.5 Compared to the risk estimates without unobserved heterogeneity
(see Table 3), the specification with unobserved heterogeneity implies somewhat lower levels
of risk. For example, the 10th (respectively, 90th) percentile of CV ranges between 0.05
and 0.06 (resp., 0.39 and 0.78), compared to between 0.07 and 0.08 (resp., 0.42 and 0.93)
in t e specification without unobserved heterogeneity. At the same time, the results remain
qualitatively similar to the baseline. Moreover, the other three graphs of Figure G11 show
that other main features of the risk and its relationship with age and inco e are preserved.
Lastly, in Figure G12 we compare the CV computed according to our baseline specification
to the one computed using the model with unobserved heterogeneity. The CV densities agree
with each other, although the model with heterogeneity tends to predict somewhat lower
risk at the bottom of the risk distribution. The two CV measures are correlated, though not
perfectly, the correlation coefficient being 0.85.
B.4 Robust CV
The CV measure that we use in the main analysis is computed as a ratio between two
conditional means; see equation (1). In order to alleviate sensitivity to outliers, one may
alternatively compute the following median-based counterpart:
C̃V(Xit) =
median(|Yit −median(Yit|Xit)| | Xit)
median(Yit | Xit)
. (B5)
This “robust” counterpart to the CV has the conditional median income in the denominator,
and the conditional median absolute deviation in the numerator, where the absolute deviation
is computed relative to the conditional median income (Arachchige et al., 2020). We estimate
the numerator and denominator using median regressions, with all macro and micro predictors
as regressors. Since both income and income absolute deviation are non-negative, in Section
D we describe a method based on Buchinsky and Hahn (1998), which we use to enforce the
non-negativity of the median outcomes in estimation.
5In Figures G9 and G10 and in Table G5, we show several descriptive statistics about the groups that we
estimate. In Figure G13 and Table G7, we report the results for 6 groups.
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. (B5)
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D we describe a method based on Buchinsky and Hahn (1998), which we use to enforce the
non-negativity of the median outcomes in estimation.
5In Figures G9 and G10 and in Table G5, we show several descriptive statistics about the groups that we
estimate. In Figure G13 and Table G7, we report the results for 6 groups.
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In Figure G14 we reproduce the main findings of Section 5 using the robust CV measure
given by equation (B5). The evolution of this measure during the period and over the life
cycle, its relationship with income, and its persistence, are all similar to what we found using
our baseline CV measure of income risk.
B.5 Beyond the CV: other statistical measures of risk
In the analysis so far, we have used the coefficient of variation as the metric to quantify
risk. In this subsection we document the level and evolution of other measures of risk, which,
similarly to CV, are based on the conditional distribution of income given predictors.
We start by reporting results for a quantile-based measure of dispersion. In this exercise
we restrict the B sample to observations with positive income. We compute the percentile
difference P90(Xit)−P10(Xit), where we estimate P90(Xit) and P10(Xit) using linear quan-
tile regressions of log income on the predictors. In Figure G15 we reproduce several of the
main findings that we previously documented using CV, now using the percentile measure.
This measure aligns well, qualitatively, with our CV. Indeed, the top left graph in Figure
G15 shows that income risk inequality increases in the recession, while the top right graph
shows that risk tends to be higher for younger individuals. The bottom left graph shows an
inverse relationship between risk, as measured by P90− P10, and income, while the bottom
right graph shows that income risk is highly persistent, especially in the bottom half of the
risk distribution. Quantitatively, the risk values P90− P10 are higher than the CV values.6
In order to directly compare the quantile-based measure of risk P90 − P10 to the CV,
in Figure G16 we plot the histogram of the CV, along with the histogram of the percentile
difference (suitably rescaled). The two histograms agree quite well. We also see that both
measures of risk are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.98.
By estimating quantile regressions, we are able to document the entire conditional dis-
tribution of log income given the predictors, not only its dispersion and location. A quan-
tity of particular interest is the skewness. In Section 3 we showed how the skewness of
log annual earnings changes decreases during the Spanish recession. In Figure G17 we re-
6This is to be expected. For example, under log normality of income and for small standard deviation, the
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port the evolution of quantiles of a percentile-b sed measure of skewnes of the conditional
distribution of log income given the predictors. Specifically, we report Kelley’s skewness,
P90(Xit)−2P50(Xit)+P10(Xit)
P90(Xit)−P10(Xit) , where we estimate P90(Xit), P50(Xit), and P10(Xit) using lin-
ear quantile regressions of log income on the predictors. The graph shows that, like the
skewness of log income changes, the skewness of the conditional distribution of log income
given the predictors also decreases during the recession. In addition, while the higher quan-
tiles of this “skewness risk” vary quite substantially over the period, the lower quantiles show
little variation. In Figure G18 we show how the skewness measure varies over the life cycle,
relates to income, and persists over time.
C Unobserved heterogeneity: a grouped fixed-effects approach
In this section we describe how we allow for unobserved predictors. To implement the grouped
fixed-effects approach of Bonhomme et al. (2021), one possibility would be to group individ-
uals based on their mean income. However, in an unbalanced panel this approach tends to
mix individual-specific heterogeneity and age, particularly when there is a strong life-cycle
component to income. To account for age, we proceed in two steps.













implement the minimization, we use a Lloyd-like algorithm (see Bonhomme and Manresa,
2015). We start with 20 randomly chosen parameter values, and select the solution that
corresponds to the highest value of the objective function. Given each starting value, we stop
the algorithm when the change in the log likelihood is less than 10−10. This first step gives
us parameters β̃(k) and group indicators k̃i.









again with respect to parameters β(k) and group indicators ki. In this specification, we
account for group effects in the intercept and the coefficients of age and age squared. We use
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10 iterations of a Lloyd-like algorithm. The group indicators k̃i provide a starting value to
initiate the algorithm. This second step gives us parameters β̂(k) and group indicators k̂i,
which are the ones we use to construct our prediction exp(X ′itβ̂(k̂i)), which is the denominator
of CV. We proceed similarly for the numerator. Hence, the CV coefficient is constructed using
two sets of groups.
We apply the method to the B sample, restricted to individuals with at least 4 observa-
tions, using 4 groups for both the numerator and the denominator of CV. In Figure G9 we
show the income profiles by age for the estimated clusters that we obtain using the above
algorithm to predict income levels (the “mean clusters”). The clusters differ not only in the
level of income, but also in the curvature of the profiles. In Figure G10 we show the CV
profiles by age for all combinations of the mean clusters and the clusters that we obtain when
predicting income absolute deviations (the “absolute deviation clusters”). We see that, while
the former tends to capture differences in risk levels between individuals, the latter tends to
pick up differences in age profiles. Lastly, in Table G5 we show the number of individuals in
each cluster and the corresponding distribution of educational attainment. We find that the
mean clusters are correlated with education, consistently with the fact that the higher edu-
cated tend to face lower risk levels. In contrast, the absolute deviation clusters are virtually
independent of education.
D Enforcing non-negativity of outcomes in quantile regression
Let Y | X be a non-negative random variable with quantile function g(x, τ). In our ap-
plication, Y is income or income absolute deviation, and X includes our micro and macro
predictors. Let Pr(Y = 0|X = x) = π(x). Thus, g(x, τ) = 0 for τ ≤ π(x). Also,
Pr(Y ≤ g(x, τ) | Y > 0, τ > π(x), X = x) = τ − π(x)
1− π(x)
.









for τ > π(x)
.
For π(x) ≈ 0, we have g(x, τ) ≈ ψ(x, τ).
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An estimator of g(x, τ) that enforces non-negativity is as follows. First, we obtain the





exp(v)/(1 + exp(v)). To get γ̂(s), we run linear quantile regressions of log income on φ(x) in
the subsample with positive income; β̂ is a logit estimate; and φ(x) is a vector of functions
of x. Finally, we compute:
ĝ(x, τ) =
{





for τ > π̂(x)
.
To ease the computational burden, we model γ(s) as piecewise linear interpolating splines
on a grid, [τ1, τ2], [τ2, τ3], ..., [τL−1, τL], contained in the unit interval. The intercept coefficients
on (0, τ1] and [τL, 1) are parameterized as the quantiles of an exponential distribution on
their respective supports. In practice, we use an equally spaced grid on the unit interval with
L = 11.
E Estimating measures of location and dispersion from sub-
jective probabilistic income expectations
For each respondent in the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF) who answers the
subjective probabilistic income expectations question described in Section 6, we observe the
fraction of points p̂j allocated to each event j = 1, . . . , 5 (adding up to 1). Here we present
a simple approach to calculate summary measures of location and dispersion from these
observations under the assumption that the underlying probabilities are normally distributed
(with mean µ and standard deviation σ). That is, we assume that the underlying process
for next year’s log income is a random walk with a household-specific drift µi and normally
distributed shocks with a household-specific standard deviation σi. The household index is
omitted in the text for conciseness.
Under normality, p1 = Φ(−0.1β − α), p2 = Φ(−0.02β − α) − Φ (−0.1β − α), p3 =
Φ(0.02β − α) − Φ (−0.02β − α), p4 = Φ(0.1β − α) − Φ (0.02β − α), p5 = 1 − Φ (0.1β − α),
for α = µ/σ and β = 1/σ. Elicited probabilities p̂j can be regarded as noisy measurements
of pj due to rounding and the inherent randomness in the elicitation process. If the p̂j are
regarded as sample frequencies from a hypothetical random sample of size m, they are the
9
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p̂j log pj .
Alternatively, p = (p1, . . . , p4) can be estimated as the posterior mean of a posterior
distribution:







for some chosen prior π (p) and value of m (e.g., m = 10). A conventional option is to use
Jeffreys prior, log π (p) = −12
∑5
j=1 log pj . This is a Dirichlet distribution of order J = 5,
which is the conjugate prior of the multinomial, therefore the posterior is also Dirichlet with







Jeffreys prior adds J/2 observations to the likelihood with equally distributed probabili-
ties. The modified estimator p̃j has the advantage that it takes values in the open interval
(0, 1) so that the inverse normal cdf transformation is still defined when p̂j = 0 or 1. In the
present statistical framework, m measures the accuracy of the process of eliciting subjective
probabilities.
We implement this approach, using a Berkson estimator that enforces the Gaussian restric-
tions on the posterior means p̃j . This estimator is based on the inverse normal probabilities:
q1 = Φ
−1 (1− c1) = 0.1β + α
q2 = Φ
−1 (1− c2) = 0.02β + α
q3 = Φ
−1 (1− c3) = −0.02β + α
q4 = Φ
−1 (1− c4) = −0.1β + α
where the cj are the cumulative probabilities cj =
∑j









and q̃j = Φ
−1 (1− c̃j). To estimate µ and σ we choose a particular solution of the previous
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system with an intuitive interpretation:
µ̃ =
(q̃1 + q̃4) + (q̃2 + q̃3)




5 (q̃1 − q̃4) + 25 (q̃2 − q̃3)
.
Lastly, mimicking the fact that the maximum likelihood estimator of θ = (α, β) is θ̂ =
argmaxθ
∑
j p̂j ln pj (θ), an alternative method to enforce the restrictions on the posterior





p̃j ln pj (θ) .
Nevertheless, in our empirical calculations of subjective risks we relied on the Berkson esti-
mator, which has a simple closed-form expression.
F Additional tables and figures on income inequality and dy-
namics
Table F1: Observations below the income threshold
Male Female
Observations Proportion Observations Proportion
2005 241674 0.033 197333 0.079
2006 255047 0.050 216508 0.110
2007 268115 0.063 234212 0.131
2008 274655 0.083 245235 0.140
2009 278062 0.143 250439 0.180
2010 278195 0.171 252533 0.198
2011 272740 0.179 250954 0.200
2012 270691 0.212 248709 0.222
2013 266659 0.220 245710 0.234
2014 259429 0.193 240226 0.217
2015 251970 0.155 235180 0.185
2016 247453 0.131 232652 0.166
2017 244782 0.110 232063 0.149
2018 242451 0.094 230715 0.134
Notes: Number of non-missing observations, and proportion of observations below the income threshold y
t
, by
year and gender. The threshold that we use in Section 3 corresponds to working part time for one quarter at
the national minimum wage.
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Table F2: Descriptive statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Females Age Shares % Education Shares %





2005 415 25434 18073 43.8 44.6 33.3 22.1 14.5 36.5 28.2 20.7
2006 435 25830 18496 44.3 43.6 33.7 22.7 14.3 36.6 27.8 21.3
2007 455 26146 18951 44.8 42.8 34.1 23.1 14.1 36.7 27.5 21.6
2008 463 26045 19278 45.6 41.6 34.6 23.8 13.7 36.6 27.4 22.3
2009 444 25952 19751 46.3 39.7 35.4 25.0 12.7 36.3 27.6 23.5
2010 433 25460 19387 46.8 38.0 36.1 25.9 12.1 36.4 27.5 24.1
2011 425 24771 18724 47.3 36.4 36.9 26.8 11.6 36.4 27.4 24.6
2012 407 23807 18093 47.6 34.5 37.8 27.7 11.1 35.8 27.6 25.6
2013 396 23091 17885 47.5 32.7 38.6 28.7 11.1 35.8 27.2 25.9
2014 397 22915 17943 47.3 31.4 39.0 29.5 11.2 35.9 26.8 26.1
2015 405 23354 18316 47.4 30.3 39.2 30.5 11.2 35.9 26.5 26.4
2016 409 23788 18741 47.4 29.5 39.1 31.4 11.1 35.7 26.3 26.8
2017 415 23817 18760 47.5 29.0 38.7 32.3 11.1 35.6 26.1 27.2
2018 420 24115 19018 47.6 28.7 37.9 33.4 11.0 35.4 26.1 27.6
Notes: CS sample. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 euros.
Table F3: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99
2005 1579 3525 5898 11725 17965 27069 40589 53102 89988 113145
2006 1641 3769 6282 12149 18270 27455 41043 53487 89851 112661
2007 1683 3860 6443 12334 18499 27824 41632 54110 91745 115135
2008 1666 3686 6078 11930 18596 28070 42138 54695 92447 115220
2009 1596 3203 5317 11346 18739 28659 43243 55554 94008 115996
2010 1581 3126 5145 11035 18432 28197 42346 54549 92360 114087
2011 1546 3019 4961 10565 17949 27311 40976 53007 89389 111225
2012 1454 2758 4565 10014 17351 26305 39416 51518 86040 107555
2013 1405 2528 4115 9285 16890 26004 39221 50777 84102 105918
2014 1425 2571 4170 9219 16790 25983 39086 50661 84804 106766
2015 1469 2752 4489 9591 16946 26274 39810 51511 87404 110410
2016 1526 3018 4916 10188 17299 26619 40242 52024 88405 112082
2017 1660 3261 5278 10592 17313 26461 39806 51533 87280 110445
2018 1714 3485 5661 11040 17599 26642 39717 51450 87574 110321
Notes: CS sample. Each column corresponds to a percentile of the distribution of annual earnings. The sample
includes both males and females. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 euros.
12
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 51 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2136
Table F2: Descriptive statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Females Age Shares % Education Shares %





2005 415 25434 18073 43.8 44.6 33.3 22.1 14.5 36.5 28.2 20.7
2006 435 25830 18496 44.3 43.6 33.7 22.7 14.3 36.6 27.8 21.3
2007 455 26146 18951 44.8 42.8 34.1 23.1 14.1 36.7 27.5 21.6
2008 463 26045 19278 45.6 41.6 34.6 23.8 13.7 36.6 27.4 22.3
2009 444 25952 19751 46.3 39.7 35.4 25.0 12.7 36.3 27.6 23.5
2010 433 25460 19387 46.8 38.0 36.1 25.9 12.1 36.4 27.5 24.1
2011 425 24771 18724 47.3 36.4 36.9 26.8 11.6 36.4 27.4 24.6
2012 407 23807 18093 47.6 34.5 37.8 27.7 11.1 35.8 27.6 25.6
2013 396 23091 17885 47.5 32.7 38.6 28.7 11.1 35.8 27.2 25.9
2014 397 22915 17943 47.3 31.4 39.0 29.5 11.2 35.9 26.8 26.1
2015 405 23354 18316 47.4 30.3 39.2 30.5 11.2 35.9 26.5 26.4
2016 409 23788 18741 47.4 29.5 39.1 31.4 11.1 35.7 26.3 26.8
2017 415 23817 18760 47.5 29.0 38.7 32.3 11.1 35.6 26.1 27.2
2018 420 24115 19018 47.6 28.7 37.9 33.4 11.0 35.4 26.1 27.6
Notes: CS sample. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 euros.
Table F3: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99
2005 1579 3525 5898 11725 17965 27069 40589 53102 89988 113145
2006 1641 3769 6282 12149 18270 27455 41043 53487 89851 112661
2007 1683 3860 6443 12334 18499 27824 41632 54110 91745 115135
2008 1666 3686 6078 11930 18596 28070 42138 54695 92447 115220
2009 1596 3203 5317 11346 18739 28659 43243 55554 94008 115996
2010 1581 3126 5145 11035 18432 28197 42346 54549 92360 114087
2011 1546 3019 4961 10565 17949 27311 40976 53007 89389 111225
2012 1454 2758 4565 10014 17351 26305 39416 51518 86040 107555
2013 1405 2528 4115 9285 16890 26004 39221 50777 84102 105918
2014 1425 2571 4170 9219 16790 25983 39086 50661 84804 106766
2015 1469 2752 4489 9591 16946 26274 39810 51511 87404 110410
2016 1526 3018 4916 10188 17299 26619 40242 52024 88405 112082
2017 1660 3261 5278 10592 17313 26461 39806 51533 87280 110445
2018 1714 3485 5661 11040 17599 26642 39717 51450 87574 110321
Notes: CS sample. Each column corresponds to a percentile of the distribution of annual earnings. The sample
includes both males and females. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 euros.
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Table F4: Descriptive statistics for the CS sample
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Females Age Shares % Education Shares %





2005 415 30064 21363 43.8 44.6 33.3 22.1 14.5 36.5 28.2 20.7
2006 435 30532 21863 44.3 43.6 33.7 22.7 14.3 36.6 27.8 21.3
2007 455 30905 22400 44.8 42.8 34.1 23.1 14.1 36.7 27.5 21.6
2008 463 30786 22788 45.6 41.6 34.6 23.8 13.7 36.6 27.4 22.3
2009 444 30676 23347 46.3 39.7 35.4 25.0 12.7 36.3 27.6 23.5
2010 433 30094 22916 46.8 38.0 36.1 25.9 12.1 36.4 27.5 24.1
2011 425 29280 22132 47.3 36.4 36.9 26.8 11.6 36.4 27.4 24.6
2012 407 28140 21387 47.6 34.5 37.8 27.7 11.1 35.8 27.6 25.6
2013 396 27294 21141 47.5 32.7 38.6 28.7 11.1 35.8 27.2 25.9
2014 397 27087 21209 47.3 31.4 39.0 29.5 11.2 35.9 26.8 26.1
2015 405 27605 21650 47.4 30.3 39.2 30.5 11.2 35.9 26.5 26.4
2016 409 28119 22153 47.4 29.5 39.1 31.4 11.1 35.7 26.3 26.8
2017 415 28153 22174 47.5 29.0 38.7 32.3 11.1 35.6 26.1 27.2
2018 420 28504 22479 47.6 28.7 37.9 33.4 11.0 35.4 26.1 27.6
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2005 1866 4166 6972 13860 21235 31997 47977 62769 106369 133741
2006 1940 4455 7426 14360 21596 32453 48514 63223 106207 133169
2007 1990 4562 7616 14580 21867 32889 49210 63959 108446 136093
2008 1969 4357 7184 14101 21981 33179 49809 64652 109276 136193
2009 1887 3786 6285 13411 22150 33876 51115 65667 111121 137111
2010 1869 3695 6082 13044 21788 33330 50055 64478 109173 134855
2011 1827 3568 5864 12488 21217 32283 48434 62656 105661 131472
2012 1719 3260 5396 11837 20509 31093 46591 60896 101702 127134
2013 1661 2988 4864 10976 19965 30737 46361 60020 99412 125199
2014 1684 3039 4929 10897 19847 30712 46202 59883 100242 126201
2015 1736 3253 5306 11337 20031 31056 47057 60888 103314 130508
2016 1804 3567 5811 12043 20448 31465 47567 61494 104497 132484
2017 1962 3855 6239 12520 20465 31277 47052 60913 103168 130550
2018 2026 4119 6691 13050 20802 31492 46947 60816 103516 130403
Notes: CS sample. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 U.S. dollars.
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Table F5: Descriptive statistics for the LS sample
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Females Age Shares % Education Shares %





2005 283 26408 19403 44.1 47.9 37.5 14.6 10.9 35.7 29.9 23.6
2006 289 27025 19756 45.1 47.2 37.9 14.9 10.3 35.8 29.5 24.3
2007 292 28027 20640 46.1 46.4 38.5 15.1 9.9 35.3 29.5 25.4
2008 286 28430 21268 46.9 44.9 39.5 15.6 9.4 35.1 29.3 26.2
2009 281 27769 21497 47.3 43.1 40.6 16.3 9.1 35.2 29.0 26.7
2010 281 26803 20921 47.6 41.6 41.5 16.9 9.0 35.3 28.7 27.0
2011 279 26119 20296 48.0 39.8 42.7 17.4 8.8 35.0 28.5 27.6
2012 273 24826 19409 48.2 37.7 44.1 18.2 8.7 34.6 28.4 28.3
2013 273 23763 18935 48.0 36.0 45.2 18.9 8.9 34.7 27.9 28.5
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2005 1946 4803 7606 13397 19022 28316 41405 53409 88304 109627
2006 2078 5194 8068 13776 19448 28718 41791 53725 88043 109562
2007 2215 5659 8626 14295 20114 29790 43246 55692 91572 113762
2008 2294 5705 8632 14403 20578 30474 44132 56604 92450 114754
2009 2002 4730 7645 13880 20535 30581 44361 56252 92750 113096
2010 1915 4457 7195 13338 19980 29763 43040 54680 90383 109702
2011 1889 4365 6955 12897 19469 28932 41687 53160 87399 106747
2012 1692 3805 6259 12109 18579 27577 39880 51314 83540 102653
2013 1555 3283 5435 11096 17968 27030 39346 50264 81190 99764
Notes: LS sample, restricted to non-missing 1-year and 5-year changes in log earnings. Annual earnings are
reported in 2018 euros.
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Table F6: Descriptive statistics for the LS sample
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Females Age Shares % Education Shares %





2005 283 31215 22935 44.1 47.9 37.5 14.6 10.9 35.7 29.9 23.6
2006 289 31945 23353 45.1 47.2 37.9 14.9 10.3 35.8 29.5 24.3
2007 292 33129 24397 46.1 46.4 38.5 15.1 9.9 35.3 29.5 25.4
2008 286 33606 25140 46.9 44.9 39.5 15.6 9.4 35.1 29.3 26.2
2009 281 32824 25411 47.3 43.1 40.6 16.3 9.1 35.2 29.0 26.7
2010 281 31682 24729 47.6 41.6 41.5 16.9 9.0 35.3 28.7 27.0
2011 279 30873 23991 48.0 39.8 42.7 17.4 8.8 35.0 28.5 27.6
2012 273 29345 22943 48.2 37.7 44.1 18.2 8.7 34.6 28.4 28.3
2013 273 28088 22382 48.0 36.0 45.2 18.9 8.9 34.7 27.9 28.5
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2005 2300 5677 8991 15835 22485 33471 48942 63131 104378 129582
2006 2456 6139 9537 16284 22988 33946 49398 63505 104070 129506
2007 2618 6690 10197 16898 23775 35213 51118 65830 108241 134470
2008 2711 6743 10203 17024 24324 36021 52166 66908 109279 135642
2009 2366 5591 9037 16407 24273 36148 52437 66492 109634 133683
2010 2263 5269 8505 15766 23617 35180 50875 64633 106835 129671
2011 2233 5160 8221 15245 23013 34199 49275 62837 103309 126178
2012 2000 4498 7399 14314 21961 32597 47140 60655 98747 121339
2013 1838 3881 6424 13116 21239 31951 46508 59414 95969 117924
Notes: LS sample, restricted to non-missing 1-year and 5-year changes in log earnings. Annual earnings are
reported in 2018 U.S. dollars.
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Table F7: Descriptive statistics for the H sample
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Females Age Shares % Education Shares %





2008 240 30037 22843 45.8 40.1 42.8 17.2 8.8 34.8 30.4 26.0
2009 242 29241 22912 46.5 38.7 43.6 17.7 8.6 34.7 30.0 26.7
2010 245 28248 22203 47.2 37.4 44.4 18.2 8.4 34.8 29.6 27.1
2011 244 27624 21558 47.7 35.6 45.5 18.9 8.2 34.5 29.5 27.8
2012 239 26153 20444 48.1 33.6 46.7 19.6 8.1 34.3 29.2 28.4
2013 238 25401 20148 48.1 31.9 47.8 20.3 8.0 34.2 28.9 28.9
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2008 3060 7238 10291 15711 21969 32328 46233 59241 96067 118977
2009 2406 6016 9087 15206 21817 32271 46126 58584 95444 116255
2010 2306 5624 8602 14706 21184 31277 44634 56748 92561 112395
2011 2305 5600 8416 14324 20668 30384 43227 55170 89604 109596
2012 2035 4941 7677 13514 19589 28698 41087 52703 85318 104343
2013 1876 4403 7036 12772 19143 28426 40805 51963 83040 103001
Notes: H sample, restricted to non-missing 1-year and 5-year changes in log earnings. Annual earnings are
reported in 2018 euros.
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Table F8: Descriptive statistics for the H sample
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Females Age Shares % Education Shares %





2008 240 35505 27001 45.8 40.1 42.8 17.2 8.8 34.8 30.4 26.0
2009 242 34563 27082 46.5 38.7 43.6 17.7 8.6 34.7 30.0 26.7
2010 245 33390 26244 47.2 37.4 44.4 18.2 8.4 34.8 29.6 27.1
2011 244 32652 25483 47.7 35.6 45.5 18.9 8.2 34.5 29.5 27.8
2012 239 30914 24165 48.1 33.6 46.7 19.6 8.1 34.3 29.2 28.4
2013 238 30025 23815 48.1 31.9 47.8 20.3 8.0 34.2 28.9 28.9
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2008 3617 8556 12165 18571 25968 38213 54649 70024 113555 140634
2009 2844 7111 10741 17974 25788 38146 54522 69248 112818 137418
2010 2726 6648 10168 17382 25040 36971 52759 67078 109410 132854
2011 2724 6619 9948 16931 24430 35915 51096 65213 105915 129546
2012 2406 5840 9075 15974 23155 33922 48566 62297 100849 123337
2013 2217 5204 8317 15096 22628 33601 48233 61422 98156 121750
Notes: H sample, restricted to non-missing 1-year and 5-year changes in log earnings. Annual earnings are
reported in 2018 U.S. dollars.
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Table F9: Descriptive statistics for the B sample
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Age Shares % Education Shares %





2006 223.091 27167 41.0 34.5 24.6 17.7 40.0 26.5 15.8
2007 233.686 27183 40.3 34.6 25.1 17.3 40.0 26.3 16.3
2008 244.511 26556 40.0 34.7 25.3 17.3 40.1 26.0 16.6
2009 249.983 25409 38.9 35.1 26.0 17.0 40.0 25.9 17.0
2010 254.180 24098 37.7 35.5 26.8 16.8 40.2 25.7 17.3
2011 253.227 22948 36.2 36.1 27.7 16.5 40.5 25.5 17.6
2012 250.995 21210 34.4 36.9 28.7 16.3 40.6 25.3 17.8
2013 247.411 20496 32.4 37.6 29.9 16.2 40.7 25.2 17.9
2014 242.084 20725 30.6 38.3 31.1 16.1 40.7 25.0 18.2
2015 235.009 21813 29.1 38.7 32.2 15.8 40.8 24.9 18.5
2016 229.111 22763 27.7 39.1 33.2 15.4 40.9 24.8 18.9
2017 225.461 23245 26.8 39.0 34.2 15.0 40.8 24.8 19.4
2018 222.442 23926 26.4 38.7 35.0 14.7 40.7 24.8 19.7
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2006 0 5370 10109 15856 21177 31976 48039 63411 110742 142959
2007 0 3043 9165 15770 21308 32173 48351 64156 112581 144502
2008 0 1631 7630 15282 21049 31755 47730 62871 110914 140991
2009 0 0 5220 13535 20318 31042 47179 62099 109646 138144
2010 0 0 4023 11790 19478 29882 45415 59767 106035 135261
2011 0 0 2396 10330 18760 28810 43815 57951 102381 130759
2012 0 0 799 8301 17607 27080 41273 54954 96155 122129
2013 0 0 328 6943 16917 26611 41087 54167 93873 119257
2014 0 0 689 7238 17104 26881 41376 54529 95231 121736
2015 0 0 1705 8743 17827 27686 42557 56121 99167 127645
2016 0 0 2548 10401 18564 28495 43530 57297 102118 131781
2017 0 49 3666 11802 18872 28702 43372 56937 101672 130799
2018 0 697 4768 12903 19373 29075 43536 57117 102123 132345
Notes: B sample. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 euros. Only males.
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Table F10: Descriptive statistics for the B sample
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Age Shares % Education Shares %





2006 223.091 32112 41.0 34.5 24.6 17.7 40.0 26.5 15.8
2007 233.686 32131 40.3 34.6 25.1 17.3 40.0 26.3 16.3
2008 244.511 31391 40.0 34.7 25.3 17.3 40.1 26.0 16.6
2009 249.983 30035 38.9 35.1 26.0 17.0 40.0 25.9 17.0
2010 254.180 28484 37.7 35.5 26.8 16.8 40.2 25.7 17.3
2011 253.227 27125 36.2 36.1 27.7 16.5 40.5 25.5 17.6
2012 250.995 25070 34.4 36.9 28.7 16.3 40.6 25.3 17.8
2013 247.411 24227 32.4 37.6 29.9 16.2 40.7 25.2 17.9
2014 242.084 24497 30.6 38.3 31.1 16.1 40.7 25.0 18.2
2015 235.009 25784 29.1 38.7 32.2 15.8 40.8 24.9 18.5
2016 229.111 26906 27.7 39.1 33.2 15.4 40.9 24.8 18.9
2017 225.461 27476 26.8 39.0 34.2 15.0 40.8 24.8 19.4
2018 222.442 28281 26.4 38.7 35.0 14.7 40.7 24.8 19.7
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2006 0 6348 11950 18743 25032 37797 56784 74954 130901 168982
2007 0 3597 10834 18641 25187 38030 57152 75835 133075 170806
2008 0 1927 9019 18064 24881 37535 56419 74316 131104 166656
2009 0 0 6171 15999 24017 36692 55767 73403 129605 163291
2010 0 0 4756 13936 23024 35321 53682 70646 125337 159883
2011 0 0 2832 12210 22175 34055 51790 68500 121018 154562
2012 0 0 945 9812 20811 32009 48786 64957 113658 144361
2013 0 0 387 8207 19997 31455 48566 64027 110961 140965
2014 0 0 814 8556 20218 31774 48908 64455 112566 143896
2015 0 0 2016 10334 21073 32726 50304 66336 117219 150881
2016 0 0 3012 12294 21943 33682 51453 67728 120707 155770
2017 0 58 4333 13951 22307 33927 51268 67301 120179 154609
2018 0 824 5636 15252 22900 34367 51461 67515 120712 156436
Notes: B sample. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 U.S. dollars. Only males.
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Table F11: Descriptive statistics for the B sample, with positive income
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Age Shares % Education Shares %





2006 218.712 27711 40.9 34.5 24.6 17.6 40.0 26.6 15.8
2007 226.159 28087 40.2 34.7 25.1 17.1 40.2 26.4 16.4
2008 235.093 27620 39.8 34.8 25.4 17.0 40.2 26.1 16.7
2009 236.784 26826 38.4 35.3 26.3 16.5 40.1 26.1 17.3
2010 239.605 25564 37.2 35.7 27.1 16.3 40.4 25.8 17.6
2011 236.440 24577 35.6 36.2 28.2 15.8 40.6 25.7 17.9
2012 229.793 23167 33.5 36.8 29.6 15.4 40.5 25.8 18.3
2013 224.752 22563 31.6 37.5 30.9 15.1 40.7 25.7 18.5
2014 221.923 22607 30.1 38.2 31.7 15.2 40.8 25.4 18.7
2015 219.181 23388 28.7 38.8 32.4 15.0 40.9 25.2 18.9
2016 215.660 24183 27.5 39.2 33.2 14.7 40.9 25.1 19.2
2017 214.367 24448 26.7 39.1 34.2 14.5 40.8 25.1 19.6
2018 213.275 24954 26.3 38.8 34.9 14.2 40.7 25.1 20.0
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2006 1987 7403 11279 16162 21459 32301 48462 63857 111662 143935
2007 1644 7194 11285 16297 21779 32723 49028 64957 114061 145903
2008 1363 6242 10351 16010 21597 32416 48457 63754 112489 142797
2009 1047 5228 8377 14860 21097 31980 48220 63369 111545 140805
2010 1026 4402 6465 13631 20268 30855 46441 61151 107852 138024
2011 621 3280 5458 12701 19661 29917 45042 59569 104753 134212
2012 444 2664 5136 11486 18737 28388 42760 56862 99211 126801
2013 359 2335 4627 10309 18208 28116 42636 56154 97214 123367
2014 344 2184 4422 10157 18277 28228 42866 56400 98274 125706
2015 433 2466 4730 11140 18738 28809 43781 57660 101636 131751
2016 500 2852 5299 12401 19347 29465 44567 58613 104174 134866
2017 633 3445 6169 13222 19507 29513 44273 58038 103296 132568
2018 773 4052 7240 13949 19895 29760 44257 58048 103687 134422
Notes: B sample, positive income. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 euros. Only males.
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Table F12: Descriptive statistics for the B sample, with positive income
(a) Panel A: Basic summary statistics
Year Obs Mean Income Age Shares % Education Shares %





2006 218.712 32755 40.9 34.5 24.6 17.6 40.0 26.6 15.8
2007 226.159 33200 40.2 34.7 25.1 17.1 40.2 26.4 16.4
2008 235.093 32648 39.8 34.8 25.4 17.0 40.2 26.1 16.7
2009 236.784 31709 38.4 35.3 26.3 16.5 40.1 26.1 17.3
2010 239.605 30217 37.2 35.7 27.1 16.3 40.4 25.8 17.6
2011 236.440 29051 35.6 36.2 28.2 15.8 40.6 25.7 17.9
2012 229.793 27384 33.5 36.8 29.6 15.4 40.5 25.8 18.3
2013 224.752 26670 31.6 37.5 30.9 15.1 40.7 25.7 18.5
2014 221.923 26723 30.1 38.2 31.7 15.2 40.8 25.4 18.7
2015 219.181 27646 28.7 38.8 32.4 15.0 40.9 25.2 18.9
2016 215.660 28585 27.5 39.2 33.2 14.7 40.9 25.1 19.2
2017 214.367 28898 26.7 39.1 34.2 14.5 40.8 25.1 19.6
2018 213.275 29496 26.3 38.8 34.9 14.2 40.7 25.1 20.0
(b) Panel B: Percentiles of annual earnings
Year P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.5
2006 2348 8750 13332 19104 25365 38181 57284 75481 131989 170135
2007 1944 8503 13339 19264 25743 38680 57953 76781 134824 172463
2008 1612 7378 12236 18924 25529 38316 57277 75359 132966 168791
2009 1238 6180 9902 17565 24937 37801 56998 74904 131850 166437
2010 1213 5203 7642 16112 23957 36472 54895 72283 127485 163148
2011 734 3877 6452 15013 23240 35363 53241 70412 123822 158644
2012 525 3149 6071 13576 22147 33555 50543 67213 117270 149883
2013 424 2760 5469 12186 21523 33234 50397 66376 114910 145824
2014 407 2582 5227 12006 21604 33366 50670 66667 116163 148589
2015 512 2914 5591 13168 22149 34053 51750 68155 120138 155734
2016 592 3371 6264 14658 22869 34829 52679 69282 123137 159416
2017 748 4072 7292 15629 23058 34886 52332 68602 122099 156700
2018 914 4790 8558 16488 23517 35177 52313 68614 122561 158891
Notes: B sample, positive income. Annual earnings are reported in 2018 U.S. dollars. Only males.
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Figure F1: Percentiles of the distribution of log annual earnings, no normalization
































































Notes: CS sample, percentiles of log annual earnings, by gender. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Notes: CS sample.
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Notes: CS sample.
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Notes: CS sample, percentiles of log annual earnings. In the top graphs, all percentiles are normalized to 0 in
2005. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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P50-P10
Notes: CS sample, percentiles of residualized log annual earnings, after controlling for age. All percentiles are
normalized to 0 in 2005. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Figure F6: Distribution of residual earnings in the population (males & females) after con-















































































2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Rescaled standard deviation
P90-P10





























2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
P90-P50
P50-P10
Notes: CS sample, percentiles of residualized log annual earnings, after controlling for age and education. All
percentiles are normalized to 0 in 2005. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Figure F7: Changes in income shares relative to 2005
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Notes: CS sample.
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Figure F8: Evolution of income percentiles and inequality, earnings & unemployment benefits
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Notes: CS sample, earnings and unemployment benefits. Top panel: percentiles of log annual income, by
gender. All percentiles are normalized to 0 in 2005. Middle and bottom panels: P90-P10 difference and rescaled
standard deviation, and P90-P50 and P50-P10 percentile differences. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Figure F9: Evolution of earnings percentiles and inequality, no immigrants
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P50-P10
Notes: CS sample, no immigrants. Top panel: percentiles of log annual earnings, by gender. All percentiles
are normalized to 0 in 2005. Middle and bottom panels: P90-P10 difference and rescaled standard deviation,
and P90-P50 and P50-P10 percentile differences. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Notes: LS sample, five-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Left   Slope: 1.79
Right Slope: -2.86
Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Notes: LS sample, five-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Notes: LS sample, five-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
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Notes: LS sample, five-year changes in log residual annual earnings. For 2005.
Figure F14: Top percentiles of one-year changes in log earnings






















































Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in residualized log earnings. All percentiles are normalized to 0 in 2005.
The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Notes: LS sample, five-year changes in residualized log earnings. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Notes: Non-missing observations on residualized log earnings in 2006 and 2014. On the x-axis we report
percentiles of log earnings in 2006. On the y-axis we report the changes in residualized log earnings between
2006 and 2014.
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Figure F17: Skewness and kurtosis of one-year log earnings changes
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Notes: LS sample, one-year changes in residualized log earnings. The standard deviation is rescaled using a
scaling factor of 2.56. Excess Crow-Siddiqui kurtosis is defined as P97.5−P2.5
P75−P25 − 2.91, so that it would be zero
for the normal distribution. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
34
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 72 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2136





































2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Women
Men
Notes: LS sample, five-year changes in residualized log earnings. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Notes: See the notes to Figure 6. Moment-based measures.
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Notes: H sample, five-year changes in residualized log earnings. On the x-axis we report percentiles of residu-
alized log permanent earnings εPit−1. In the top panel we show the P90-P10 percentile difference, in the middle
panel we show Kelley skewness, and in the bottom panel we show excess Crow-Siddiqui kurtosis. The various
curves on the graphs corresponds to various age groups: between 25 and 34 years, between 35 and 44, and
between 45 and 55 years, respectively.
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Notes: See the notes to Figure F20. Moment-based measures.
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Figure F22: Evolution of mobility over the life cycle
(a) Males
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Notes: See the notes to Figure 8.
Figure F23: Evolution of mobility over time
(a) Males
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Notes: See the notes to Figure 8.
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Figure F24: Evolution of 10-year mobility over time
(a) Males
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Notes: See the notes to Figure 8.





























































Notes: CS sample, log annual earnings. The sample is restricted to age-25 workers only. The shaded areas
indicate recession years.
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Cohort 2005 Cohort 2010
Cohort 2015
Notes: CS sample, log annual earnings. The different curves correspond to different cohorts of workers. The
shaded areas indicate recession years.
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G Additional tables and figures on income risk inequality
G.1 Baseline CV measure





























Notes: B sample, with positive income. Exponential specification using all macro and micro predictors. Selected
quantiles of the distribution of CV(Xit) given income Yit−1, and binned estimate of Std(log(Yit) |Yit−1),
rescaled for comparability.
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Table G1: Poisson regression results
(1) (2)
Income levels Income absolute deviations
Log lagged income 0.525 1.025
(0.107) (0.221)
Log lagged income squared 0.532 -0.0107
(0.0864) (0.167)
Log lagged income cubed 0.0299 -0.0251
(0.0291) (0.0363)




Age squared 0.000615 -0.000444
(0.000102) (0.000415)
Education: lower secondary 0.102 -0.0280
(0.0183) (0.0712)
Education: upper secondary 0.315 0.347
(0.0204) (0.0941)
Education: college 0.733 0.859
(0.0257) (0.138)
Days worked in past year -0.00134 -0.00382
(0.000315) (0.000937)
Indicator that out-of-work income is zero -1.409 -2.475
(0.181) (0.709)
Log out-of-work income in past year -0.997 -1.393
(0.0917) (0.359)
Indicator that worked full year in past year -0.0214 0.0136
(0.0416) (0.201)
Indicator that worked full year in past two years 0.00279 -0.414
(0.0343) (0.207)
Indicator that worked full year in past three years 0.0797 0.536
(0.0242) (0.212)
Permanent contract in past year -0.0149 0.173
(0.0236) (0.120)





Notes: B sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. In column (2), the
dependent variable is |Yit − exp(X ′itβ̂)|, where β̂ is shown in column (1). The standard errors in column (2)
do not account for the fact that β̂ is estimated. Macro predictors and interactions with age and age squared
are included in the regressions, but omitted from the table for conciseness.
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G.2 After-tax income
Table G2: Effective Tax Rates
year base 1 tau 1 base 2 tau 2 base 3 tau 3 base 4 tau 4 base 5 tau 5 base 6 tau 6
2005 0 8.72 4080.0 4.42 14076.0 10.28 26316.0 16.74 45900.0 26.43 . .
2006 0 11.29 4161.6 4.71 14357.5 10.52 26842.3 17.03 46818.0 26.89 . .
2007 0 5.68 17360.0 12.32 32360.0 18.49 52360.0 27.5 . . . .
2008 0 3.68 17707.2 10.51 33007.2 17.38 53407.2 26.83 . . . .
2009 0 3.31 17707.2 10.45 33007.2 17.28 53407.2 26.66 . . . .
2010 0 4.17 17707.2 12.25 33007.2 18.34 53407.2 27.03 . . . .
2011 0 3.74 17707.2 12.21 33007.2 18.25 53407.2 26.42 120000.2 34.59 175000.2 39.58
2012 0 3.75 17707.2 12.93 33007.2 19.47 53407.2 28.28 120000.2 37.61 175000.2 43.31
2013 0 3.62 17707.2 13.12 33007.2 19.55 53407.2 28.32 120000.2 37.75 175000.2 43.80
2014 0 3.48 17707.2 13.12 33007.2 19.52 53407.2 28.16 120000.2 37.52 175000.2 43.68
2015 0 1.68 12450.0 5.95 20200.0 12.66 34000.0 18.81 60000.0 28.68 . .
2016 0 2.04 12450.0 6.02 20200.0 12.89 35200.0 19.22 60000.0 28.62 . .
2017 0 2.47 12450.0 6.20 20200.0 12.79 35200.0 19.38 60000.0 28.92 . .
2018 0 2.47 12450.0 6.20 20200.0 12.79 35200.0 19.38 60000.0 28.92 . .
Notes: “base x” represents the upper and lower bounds of income brackets. “tau x” represents the average
effective tax rates. All income bracket bounds are in nominal euros. Average effective tax rates are in percent.
Table G3: Income risk over the period, in numbers, after-tax income
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
P90/P10 9.17 5.18 5.65 5.72 6.76 9.16 9.89 10.95 12.68 13.32 11.91 10.37 9.31 8.25
P90/P50 6.41 3.97 4.20 4.19 4.92 6.41 6.70 7.23 8.17 8.46 7.75 6.93 6.52 5.81
P50/P10 1.43 1.30 1.34 1.36 1.37 1.43 1.48 1.51 1.55 1.58 1.54 1.50 1.43 1.42
p10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
p25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
p50 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
p75 0.32 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.35 0.33 0.29
p90 0.67 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.52 0.67 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.93 0.85 0.75 0.70 0.61
Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors. After-tax income.
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Notes: Income in thousands of euros. See the text for how we construct after-tax income.
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Notes: B sample. On the x-axis we report the percentiles of CV based on before-tax income. On the y-axis we
report the percentiles of CV based on after-tax income.
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Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors.
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Figure G5: CV, after-tax income
























































































Notes: B sample. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro predictors. After-tax income. The
shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Figure G6: CV, income net of unemployment benefits
























































































Notes: B sample, income net of unemployment benefits. Exponential specification, using all macro and micro
predictors. After-tax income. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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G.3 Neural network specification
Figure G7: CV, neural network specification





















































































Notes: B sample. Neural network specification with Poisson loss. One layer with 8 nodes for the conditional
mean and 7 nodes for the conditional mean absolute deviation. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Table G4: Income risk over the period, in numbers, neural network specification
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
P90/P10 10.82 6.41 6.96 7.04 7.85 9.33 10.52 12.51 14.16 14.93 13.98 12.59 11.43 10.63
P90/P50 6.63 4.31 4.64 4.69 5.27 6.03 6.55 7.55 8.09 8.07 7.66 7.10 6.76 6.49
P50/P10 1.63 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.49 1.55 1.61 1.66 1.75 1.85 1.83 1.77 1.69 1.64
p10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
p25 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
p50 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10
p75 0.34 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.30 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.28
p90 0.71 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.58 0.66 0.71 0.81 0.87 0.94 0.87 0.78 0.81 0.64
Notes: B sample. Neural network specification with Poisson loss. One layer with 8 nodes for the conditional
mean and 7 nodes for the conditional mean absolute deviation.











Notes: B sample, using all macro and micro predictors. The correlation coefficient is computed after trimming
the 99th percentiles of both CV measures.
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G.4 Specification with unobserved heterogeneity
Table G5: Education Distribution of Individuals by Cluster
(a) Mean clusters
Education (Proportion of Indivs.)
Cluster # of Indiv. Primary Lower Sec. Upper Sec. College
1 20002 0.16 0.33 0.27 0.24
2 96641 0.17 0.39 0.25 0.19
3 132677 0.16 0.43 0.25 0.16
4 56827 0.23 0.40 0.23 0.14
(b) Absolute deviation clusters
Education (Proportion of Indivs.)
Cluster # of Indiv. Primary Lower Sec. Upper Sec. College
1 73778 0.17 0.43 0.24 0.17
2 100890 0.17 0.39 0.25 0.19
3 51268 0.20 0.42 0.23 0.15
4 80211 0.17 0.39 0.27 0.17
Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Specification with unobserved het-
erogeneity, 4 groups. The mean clusters correspond to the prediction of income levels, the absolute deviation
clusters correspond to the prediction of income absolute deviations.























Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Specification with unobserved het-
erogeneity, 4 groups. The mean clusters correspond to the prediction of income levels, the absolute deviation
clusters correspond to the prediction of income absolute deviations.
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Figure G10: Average CV over age, by mean cluster and absolute deviation cluster




































































Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Specification with unobserved het-
erogeneity, 4 groups. The mean clusters correspond to the prediction of income levels, the absolute deviation
clusters correspond to the prediction of income absolute deviations.
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Figure G11: CV, specification with unobserved heterogeneity






















































































Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Exponential specification, using all
macro and micro predictors, and unobserved heterogeneity. 4 groups. The shaded areas indicate recession
years.
53
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 90 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2136
Table G6: Income risk over the period, in numbers, specification with unobserved hetero-
geneity
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
P90/P10 10.59 6.48 6.86 7.41 8.73 10.72 11.25 12.09 13.29 13.72 12.97 11.76 10.86 9.60
P90/P50 5.00 3.35 3.56 3.83 4.35 4.98 5.03 5.28 5.56 5.69 5.70 5.46 5.27 4.74
P50/P10 2.12 1.93 1.93 1.94 2.01 2.15 2.24 2.29 2.39 2.41 2.28 2.15 2.06 2.03
p10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
p25 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
p50 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11
p75 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.23
p90 0.60 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.50 0.59 0.63 0.71 0.77 0.78 0.73 0.64 0.60 0.53
Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Exponential specification, using all
macro and micro predictors and unobserved heterogeneity. 4 groups.











Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Exponential specification, using all
macro and micro predictors, and unobserved heterogeneity in the right graph (4 groups). The correlation
coefficient is computed after trimming the 99th percentiles of both CV measures.
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Figure G13: CV, specification with unobserved heterogeneity, 6 groups






















































































Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Exponential specification, using all
macro and micro predictors, and unobserved heterogeneity. 6 groups.
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Table G7: Income risk over the period, in numbers, specification with unobserved hetero-
geneity, 6 groups
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
P90/P10 11.99 7.33 7.81 8.34 9.76 11.90 12.62 13.77 15.23 15.75 14.94 13.65 12.64 11.28
P90/P50 5.04 3.47 3.68 3.87 4.34 4.99 5.09 5.36 5.70 5.83 5.80 5.57 5.36 4.87
P50/P10 2.38 2.11 2.12 2.16 2.25 2.39 2.48 2.57 2.67 2.70 2.58 2.45 2.36 2.32
p10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
p25 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
p50 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11
p75 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.24
p90 0.60 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.50 0.59 0.63 0.71 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.65 0.60 0.54
Notes: B sample, individuals with at least 4 observations prior to 2018. Exponential specification, using all
macro and micro predictors and unobserved heterogeneity. 6 groups.
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G.5 Robust CV
Figure G14: Robust CV measure




















































































Notes: B sample. Robust CV measure, see equation (B5). The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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G.6 Beyond the CV
Figure G15: Quantile-based dispersion









































































































Notes: B sample, with positive income. Quantile-based measure of dispersion risk, P90(Xit)−P10(Xit), where
P90(Xit) and P10(Xit) are estimated using linear quantile regressions of log income on all macro and micro
predictors. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Notes: B sample, with positive income. CV is our CV measure (i.e., conditional mean absolute deviation
divided by conditional mean). Quantile-based dispersion is P90(Xit) − P10(Xit) (rescaled), where P90(Xit)
and P10(Xit) are estimated using linear quantile regressions of log income on all macro and micro predictors.
The correlation coefficient is computed after trimming the 99th percentiles of both CV measures.























Notes: B sample, with positive income. Quantile-based measure of skewness risk, P90(Xit)−2P50(Xit)+P10(Xit)
P90(Xit)−P10(Xit)
,
where P90(Xit), P50(Xit), and P10(Xit) are estimated using linear quantile regressions of log income on all
macro and micro predictors. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Figure G18: Quantile-based skewness, additional results









































































Notes: B sample, with positive income. Quantile-based measure of skewness risk, P90(Xit)−2P50(Xit)+P10(Xit)
P90(Xit)−P10(Xit)
,
where P90(Xit), P50(Xit), and P10(Xit) are estimated using linear quantile regressions of log income on all
macro and micro predictors.
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G.7 The income risk for civil servants
Table G8: Income risk over the period, in numbers, civil servants
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
P90/P10 1.65 1.73 1.76 1.76 1.73 1.72 1.69 1.63 1.58 1.49 1.44 1.47 1.45 1.44
P90/P50 1.43 1.51 1.53 1.52 1.50 1.48 1.47 1.42 1.38 1.31 1.27 1.30 1.28 1.28
P50/P10 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.13 1.13
p10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
p25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
p50 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
p75 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
p90 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
Notes: B sample, restricted to civil servants under permanent contracts. Exponential specification, using all
macro and micro predictors.
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Garćıa-Miralles, E., N. Guner, and R. Ramos (2019). “The Spanish personal income tax:
facts and parametric estimates”, SERIEs, Vol. 10, pp. 439-477.
Goodfellow, I., Y. Bengio, and A. Courville (2016). Deep Learning, MIT Press, https://
mitpress.mit.edu/books/deep-learning.
H2O.ai (2020). H2O: R Interface for H2O, R package version 3.30.1.3.
Hahn, J., and G. Kuersteiner (2011). “Bias reduction for dynamic non-linear panel data
models with fixed effects”, Econometric Theory, Vol. 27, No. 6, pp. 1152-1191.
62
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS 
2020  VICTORIA IVASHINA, LUC LAEVEN and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Loan types and the bank lending channel.
2021  SERGIO MAYORDOMO, NICOLA PAVANINI and EMANUELE TARANTINO: The impact of alternative forms of bank 
consolidation on credit supply and fi nancial stability.
2022  ALEX ARMAND, PEDRO CARNEIRO, FEDERICO TAGLIATI and YIMING XIA: Can subsidized employment tackle 
long-term unemployment? Experimental evidence from North Macedonia.
2023  JACOPO TIMINI and FRANCESCA VIANI: A highway across the Atlantic? Trade and welfare effects of the 
EU-Mercosur agreement.
2024  CORINNA GHIRELLI, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: Economic policy uncertainty in Latin America: 
measurement using Spanish newspapers and economic spillovers.
2025  MAR DELGADO-TÉLLEZ, ESTHER GORDO, IVÁN KATARYNIUK and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: The decline in public 
investment: “social dominance” or too-rigid fi scal rules?
2026  ELVIRA PRADES-ILLANES and PATROCINIO TELLO-CASAS: Spanish regions in Global Value Chains: How important? 
How different?
2027  PABLO AGUILAR, CORINNA GHIRELLI, MATÍAS PACCE and ALBERTO URTASUN: Can news help measure economic 
sentiment? An application in COVID-19 times.
2028  EDUARDO GUTIÉRREZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO, DANIEL OTO-PERALÍAS and ROBERTO RAMOS: The spatial 
distribution of population in Spain: an anomaly in European perspective.
2029  PABLO BURRIEL, CRISTINA CHECHERITA-WESTPHAL, PASCAL JACQUINOT, MATTHIAS SCHÖN and NIKOLAI 
STÄHLER: Economic consequences of high public debt: evidence from three large scale DSGE models.
2030  BEATRIZ GONZÁLEZ: Macroeconomics, Firm Dynamics and IPOs.
2031  BRINDUSA ANGHEL, NÚRIA RODRÍGUEZ-PLANAS and ANNA SANZ-DE-GALDEANO: Gender Equality and the Math 
Gender Gap.
2032  ANDRÉS ALONSO and JOSÉ MANUEL CARBÓ: Machine learning in credit risk: measuring the dilemma between 
prediction and supervisory cost.
2033  PILAR GARCÍA-PEREA, AITOR LACUESTA and PAU ROLDAN-BLANCO: Raising Markups to Survive: Small Spanish 
Firms during the Great Recession.
2034  MÁXIMO CAMACHO, MATÍAS PACCE and GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS: Spillover Effects in International Business 
Cycles.
2035  ÁNGEL IVÁN MORENO and TERESA CAMINERO: Application of text mining to the analysis of climate-related disclosures.
2036  EFFROSYNI ADAMOPOULOU and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Wage determination and the bite of collective contracts in 
Italy and Spain: evidence from the metal working industry.
2037  MIKEL BEDAYO, GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ and RAQUEL VEGAS: Screening and Loan Origination Time: 
Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures.
2038  BRINDUSA ANGHEL, PILAR CUADRADO and FEDERICO TAGLIATI: Why cognitive test scores of Spanish adults are so 
low? The role of schooling and socioeconomic background
2039  CHRISTOPH ALBERT, ANDREA CAGGESE and BEATRIZ GONZÁLEZ: The Short- and Long-run Employment Impact of 
COVID-19 through the Effects of Real and Financial Shocks on New Firms.
2040  GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, DAVID MARTÍNEZ-MIERA and JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ: Who Truly Bears (Bank) Taxes? Evidence from 
Only Shifting Statutory Incidence.
2041  FELIX HOLUB, LAURA HOSPIDO and ULRICH J. WAGNER: Urban air pollution and sick leaves: evidence from social 
security data.
2042  NÉLIDA DÍAZ SOBRINO, CORINNA GHIRELLI, SAMUEL HURTADO, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: 
The narrative about the economy as a shadow forecast: an analysis using Banco de España quarterly reports.
2043  NEZIH GUNER, JAVIER LÓPEZ-SEGOVIA and ROBERTO RAMOS: Reforming the individual income tax in Spain.
2101  DARÍO SERRANO-PUENTE: Optimal progressivity of personal income tax: a general equilibrium evaluation for Spain.
2102  SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE, HANNES MUELLER and CARLOS SANZ: Economic uncertainty and divisive politics: evidence 
from the Dos Españas.
2103  IVÁN KATARYNIUK, VÍCTOR MORA-BAJÉN and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: EMU deepening and sovereign debt spreads: using 
political space to achieve policy space.
2104  DARÍO SERRANO-PUENTE: Are we moving towards an energy-effi cient low-carbon economy? An input-output LMDI 
decomposition of CO2 emissions for Spain and the EU28.
2105  ANDRÉS ALONSO and JOSÉ MANUEL CARBÓ: Understanding the performance of machine learning models to predict 
credit default: a novel approach for supervisory evaluation.
2106 JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE and PABLO BURRIEL: Market polarization and the Phillips curve.
2107  JUAN de LUCIO and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: New dimensions of regulatory complexity and their economic cost. 
An analysis using text mining. 
2108  DANILO LEIVA-LEON and LUIS UZEDA: Endogenous time variation in vector autoregressions.
2109  CORINNA GHIRELLI, ANDREA GONZÁLEZ, JOSÉ LUIS HERRERA and SAMUEL HURTADO: Weather, mobility and the 
evolution of the Covid-19 pandemic.
2110  KLODIANA ISTREFI, FLORENS ODENDAHL and GIULIA SESTIERI: Fed communication on fi nancial stability concerns 
and monetary policy decisions: revelations from speeches.
2111  YUNUS AKSOY, HENRIQUE S. BASSO and CAROLYN ST AUBYN: Time Variation in Lifecycle Consumption and Income.
2112  JENNIFER PEÑA and ELVIRA PRADES: Price setting in Chile: micro evidence from consumer on-line prices during the 
social outbreak and Covid-19.
2113  NEZIH GUNER, YULIYA A. KULIKOVA and ARNAU VALLADARES-ESTEBAN: Does the added worker effect matter?
2114  RODOLFO G. CAMPOS and JACOPO TIMINI: Unequal trade, unequal gains: the heterogeneous impact of MERCOSUR.
2115 JAVIER QUINTANA: Import competition, regional divergence, and the rise of the skilled city.
2116  PATRICK MACNAMARA, MYROSLAV PIDKUYKO and RAFFAELE ROSSI: Marginal Tax Changes with Risky 
Investment.
2117  RODOLFO G. CAMPOS, JACOPO TIMINI and ELENA VIDAL: Structural gravity and trade agreements: does the 
measurement of domestic trade matter?
2118  ALESSANDRO MELCARNE, JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and ROK SPRUK: Democracy, technocracy and 
economic growth: evidence from 20 century Spain.
2119  ÁNGEL ESTRADA and DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Recycling carbon tax revenues in Spain. Environmental and 
economic assessment of selected green reforms.
2120  ALEJANDRO FERNÁNDEZ-CEREZO, BEATRIZ GONZÁLEZ, MARIO IZQUIERDO and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: 
Firm-level heterogeneity in the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
2121  EDUARDO GUTIÉRREZ and CÉSAR MARTÍN MACHUCA: The effect of tariffs on Spanish goods exports.
2122  JACOPO TIMINI: Revisiting the ‘Cobden-Chevalier network’ trade and welfare effects.
2123  ALEJANDRO BUESA, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Awareness of pandemics and the impact of 
COVID-19.
2124  ALICIA AGUILAR and DIEGO TORRES: The impact of COVID-19 on analysts’ sentiment about the banking sector.
2125  SILVIA ALBRIZIO, IVÁN KATARYNIUK, LUIS MOLINA and JAN SCHÄFER: ECB euro liquidity lines.
2126  ANTHONY BALD, ERIC CHYN, JUSTINE HASTINGS and MARGARITA MACHELETT: The causal impact of removing 
children from abusive and neglectful homes.
2127  IRMA ALONSO, PEDRO SERRANO and ANTONI VAELLO-SEBASTIÀ: The impact of heterogeneous unconventional 
monetary policies on the expectations of market crashes.
2128  MARÍA T. GONZÁLEZ-PÉREZ: Lessons from estimating the average option-implied volatility term structure for the 
Spanish banking sector.
2129  SIMÓN A. RELLA, YULIYA A. KULIKOVA, EMMANOUIL T. DERMITZAKIS and FYODOR A. KONDRASHOV: Rates of 
SARS-COV-2 transmission and vaccination impact the fate of vaccine-resistant strains.
2130  MATÍAS LAMAS and DAVID MARTÍNEZ-MIERA: Sectorial holdings and stock prices: the household-bank nexus.
2131  ALBERT BANAL-ESTAÑOL, ENRIQUE BENITO, DMITRY KHAMETSHIN and JIANXING WEI: Asset encumbrance and 
bank risk: theory and fi rst evidence from public disclosures in Europe.
2132  ISABEL ARGIMÓN and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: Business complexity and geographic expansion in banking.
2133  LUIS GUIROLA: Does political polarization affect economic expectations?: Evidence from three decades of cabinet shifts 
in Europe.
2134  CHRISTIANE BAUMEISTER, DANILO LEIVA-LEÓN and ERIC SIMS: Tracking weekly state-level economic conditions.
2135  SERGI BASCO, DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: House prices and misallocation: The impact 
of the collateral channel on productivity.
2136  MANUEL ARELLANO, STÉPHANE BONHOMME, MICOLE DE VERA, LAURA HOSPIDO and SIQI WEI: Income risk 
inequality: Evidence from Spanish administrative records.
